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RETHINKING VISITATION:
FROM A PARENTAL TO A RELATIONAL RIGHT
AYELET BLECHER-PRIGAT*
I. INTRODUCTION
Visitation with children has been in the public and legal limelight for
several decades. Despite the enormous interest evoked by this issue and the
extensive concern with this right, confusion and dissatisfaction with existing
legal rules surrounding visitation has only intensified. This article argues that
the perplexity surrounding this issue reflects the absence of an underlying
theory of visitation that would specify the interests and values that a right to
visitation should aim to protect. It is further argued that the current perception
of visitation rights as parental rights and the attempts to resolve the dilemmas
prompted by visitation within a parental rights context thwart the development
of a theory of visitation. The article proposes an alternative perspective on these
dilemmas that challenges the fundamental premise of visitation as a parental
right and as an integral component of the rights cluster associated with parental
status. Instead, it is suggested to understand the right to visitation as
independent of the cluster of rights associated with parental status and based on
relational values.
In rejecting the understanding of visitation rights as parental rights, this
article does not follow the child advocates’ view of visitation rights merely as
1
children’s rights. Rather, visitation rights are considered as adults’ rights.
Nevertheless, it is argued that the law’s distinction between different adult
claimants based on their parental status (or lack thereof) is flawed. This article
seeks to redirect the law concerning adults’ claims to enjoy relationships with
children toward a legal model based on relational interests and on the needs of
both children and adults.
The first part of the article deals with the current view of visitation as a
parental right and with the implications of this perception. It describes the legal
rules based on this approach, which distinguish between claimants of visitation
rights on grounds of parental status or lack thereof. Then it addresses the
growing critique of traditional visitation rules in the wake of extensive changes
in family structure and their effect on the meaningful relationships that children

* I thank Ariela Dubler and Carol Sanger for their insights at the early stages of this project.
Special thanks to Jim Dwyer for his generous and helpful comments on a previous draft.
1. This framework of analysis does not attempt to challenge the rights of children to maintain
significant relationships in their lives, but rather recognizes that adults too may have interests in
maintaining relationships with children. These interests should also be legally recognized and
protected.
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form with adults, whether or not they are legally recognized as their parents.
Following, there is an examination of the legislative and judicial reactions to this
critique and the deep confusion that plagues this area of law, which culminated
2
in the Troxel v. Granville decision of the Supreme Court.
The article argues that the current confusion concerning visitation can be
attributed to the existence of two separate and conflicting notions of visitation
appearing in case law, legislation, and jurisprudence. The first and more overt
notion emphasizes the underlying relational values, which recognize the
interests of adults who have nurtured and cared for children and enable
children to maintain significant relationships in their lives. The second and more
implicit notion embodies remnants of the perception of children as their parents’
property, extolling the institution of marriage and the nuclear family as the
preferred model. The co-existence of these two conflicting subtexts within
visitation jurisprudence thwarts the development of a visitation theory and
perpetuates turmoil in this legal domain.
The article demonstrates that the understanding of visitation as a parental
right, which marginalizes the nurture and care of children and disregards their
relational interests, is incompatible with a relational understating of visitation.
Only by detaching visitation from the cluster of rights, privileges, and
responsibilities comprised in parental status can we begin to construe it as a
relational right and develop a coherent visitation theory.
Detaching visitation from the bundle of rights associated with parenthood
will transform not only the right to visitation but legal parenthood itself,
strengthening the tie between child rearing and rights considered parental. Note
that, although this article seeks to detach one element from the cluster of rights
associated with parenthood, it does not pave the way for the unbundling of
legal parenthood. Parental status is significant, and, at least partly, this
significance stems from the exclusiveness of the parental status. An additional
advantage of the proposal made in this article, then, is that it enables the
preservation of parental exclusivity while recognizing the visitation rights of
both parents and non-parents.
II. VISITATION AS A PARENTAL RIGHT
The right to visitation is generally perceived as a parental right, part of the
cluster of rights associated with parental status. This understanding is evident
mainly in two basic principles of visitation rules. First, visitation rights are
considered to arise from the very fact of parenthood, so that parents are entitled
to this right simply by being legally recognized as parents. Second, visitation
rights are subject to the general rule of parental exclusivity: only a child’s legal
parents have rights considered parental, and “non-parents cannot acquire
3
them.” Thus, whereas parents are usually entitled to visitation, non-parents are
not. Note that a right to visitation, as opposed to merely a privilege to visit a

2. 530 U.S. 57 *2000).
3. Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal
Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 883 (1984). For
current exceptions to this general rule, see infra notes 35–42 and accompanying text.
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child, also entails a duty. Custodial parents in particular are under a minimal
duty of non-interference toward a person granted visitation rights.
A. Parental Visitation Rights
Parents’ rights to visitation are considered natural, inherent, and arising
5
from the very fact of parenthood. The parental right of visitation is considered,
absent custody, to protect the parents’ interest in the companionship of their
6
children. Parental visitation rights are strong and granted as a matter of
entitlement, so that courts are usually reluctant to deny them or even restrict
7
them.
Ostensibly, parents’ visitation rights are subject to the “best interest of the
child” standard, but this is not an accurate description of the law as presently
8
applied. Visitation rights are granted to parents even when the parent making
the request has never lived with the child or never demonstrated any
9
willingness or even any desire to have custody of the child. Most courts are
averse to deny visitation to legally recognized parents, even in cases of abusive
parents, where supervised visitation seems sufficient to guard the child against
10
serious danger. Even where a child expresses unwillingness to spend time with
the parent, courts will generally refuse to deny or suspend parents’ visitations,
11
which are routinely ordered over children’s objections. Indeed, a parent will be

4. Cf. James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents'
Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1371, 1374–76 (1994) (discussing the difference between parental childrearing rights and parental child-rearing privileges).
5. See, e.g., In re Marriage of L.R., 559 N.E.2d 779, 789 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Chandler v. Bishop,
702 A.2d 813, 817–18 (N.H. 1997).
6. The right of parents to control the upbringing of their children was acknowledged by the
Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923). For the weight and importance that is
attributed to this right, see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (holding that a state must
use due process to deny parents the right to their children).
7. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Diehl, 221 Ill. App. 3d 410, 429 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
8. James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children's Existing Rights in State Decision Making About Their
Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 845, 932–33 (2003). The "best interest of the child" standard
does play some role in determining the amount and particular form of visitation. But here as well,
the presumption in most jurisdictions is that non-custodial parents should receive "standard
visitation"—understood as weekend-long stays every other week, one overnight every week, and a
couple of weeks in the summer—absent a showing that this is likely to significantly harm the child.
Id. at 938.
9. Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents and Grandchildren: Actualizing Interdependency in
Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1315, 1369 (1994); Dwyer, supra note 8, at 934.
10. Leigh Goodmark, From Property to Personhood: What the Legal System Should Do for Children in
Family Violence Cases, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 237, 271 (1999); Dwyer, supra note 8, at 936. This
interpretation stretches the best interest of the child standard to its outer limits.
11. Cynthia E. Cordle, Note, Note: Open Adoption: The Need for Legislative Action, 2 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 275, 295–96 (1995). See also Michael J. Lewinski, Note, Visitation Beyond the Traditional
Limitations, 60 IND. L. J. 191, 198 (1984); Dwyer, supra note 8, at 936–37. Cases of children expressly
opposing visitation involve mostly older children, and the issues they raise are thus different from
the ones I discuss in this article. Nevertheless, I found it worthy to mention these cases to exemplify
the strength of parental visitation rights. Practically, older children can usually avoid spending time
with a non-custodial parent by not complying with court orders. Usually, courts would not cut off
child support or use extreme measures such as ordering police enforcement of visitation orders,
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denied visitation rights only under exceptional and rare circumstances, usually
12
when there is a clear showing of physical or emotional danger to the child.
Some scholars have even suggested that parental visitation rights are
13
constitutionally protected. So far, no Supreme Court case has overtly
recognized visitation as a fundamental interest of non-custodial parents,
entitling them to substantial due process. Nevertheless, several decisions have
recognized the interests of non-custodial parents in having a relationship with
their children as a liberty interest sufficient to warrant application of the
14
procedural due process doctrine. Federal and state courts have occasionally
interpreted these Supreme Court rulings as suggesting that parental visitation
15
rights are constitutionally protected. Other courts, however, have declined to
16
recognize constitutional protection of parental visitation rights.
While the constitutionality of parents’ visitation rights is still undecided,
17
the strength of parental visitation rights is unquestionable. For purposes of this
although children have occasionally been jailed to coerce them to visit the non-custodial parent.
Dwyer, supra note 8, at 937.
12. 24A Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 973 (2008); Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act §
407.
13. See, e.g., Steven L. Novinson, Post-Divorce Visitation: Untying the Triangular Knot, 1983 U. ILL.
L. REV. 121, 124–39.
14. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 745. In Santosky, the Supreme Court struck down a New York
law that terminated parental rights if the state proved by a "fair preponderance of the evidence" that
the child was permanently neglected. The Court held that a parent's right to raise his or her child
could be terminated only upon "clear and convincing" proof that the child was neglected. Id. at 769.
"Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the
irretrievable destruction of their family life." Id. at 753. Thus, the interests of parents in visiting and
communication with their children after temporarily losing custody were acknowledged by the
Court as important enough to entitle the parent to procedural protections mandated by the Due
Process Clause. In Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965), the Court held that failure to give a
non-custodial parent notice of an adoption proceeding "violated the most rudimentary demands of
due process of law." The Court thus recognized the interest of a divorced non-custodial father in the
preservation of his visitation rights as a "liberty interest" sufficient to warrant application of
procedural due process doctrine.
15. See, e.g., Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 594–95 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also In re C.J., 729
A. 2d 89, 94 (Pa. Super. 1999); Hoversten v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 4th 636, 641 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999); In re Julie M., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 354, 358 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); McAlister v. Shaver, 633 So. 2d
494, 496 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
16. See, e.g. Young v. County of Fulton, 999 F. Supp. 282, 286–87 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) ("The plaintiff
has failed to set forth even one case which establishes that visitation, as opposed to custody, is a
constitutionally protected liberty interest of a parent who does not have custody"); In re Marriage of
Brewer, 760 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988). See also Mendez v. Greening, 814 P.2d 42 (Kan. Ct.
App., 1991) (conditioning visitation on payment of support did not violate the father's constitutional
rights).
17. Some scholars have criticized the one-sided nature of parents' visitation rights; namely, that
the visitation rights of parents that courts and legislators seem so eager to protect are not reciprocal.
See, e.g., Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1415, 1468 (1991). Currently, a child does not have a legal right of visitation with her parents.
Courts have refused to recognize such a right and rejected claims to compel visitation. See, e.g.,
Louden v. Olpin, 118 Cal. App. 3d 565, 567; Dana v. Dana, 789 P.2d 726, 730 (Utah App. 1990); In re
Joshua M., 274 Cal. Rptr. 222, 225 (1990) (holding that a father may terminate his parental rights over
the objection of the child's mother). Courts have also denied children's claims for compensation for
emotional damage allegedly resulting from the lack of parental companionship. See, e.g., Burnette v.
Wahl, 588 P.2d 1105, 1112 (Or. 1978).
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article, doubts over the constitutionality of parental visitation rights attest that
these rights represent an exception in the cluster of rights associated with
parenthood. Visitation provides the only means to enable a non-custodial parent
to maintain a relationship with the child. In essence, denying visitation is
tantamount to terminating the parental rights of the non-custodial parent.
Nevertheless, the constitutionality of parents’ visitation rights remains
debatable, unlike other parental rights associated with custody whose
18
constitutionality has long been recognized.
B. The Traditional View: Denying Visitation Rights to Non-Parents
Since visitation is considered part of the cluster of rights associated with
parenthood, non-parents have usually been barred from claiming visitation
rights. Contrary to the almost absolute right of parents to visitation, the interests
of non-parents in developing or maintaining relationships with children have
not traditionally been respected, absent special circumstances, legal recognition,
19
or protection. The law has created a stark dichotomy between “parents” and
“non-parents,” and parenthood has generally been considered an exclusive
status where only a child’s legal parents could claim rights with respect to the
20
child. More recently, as is discussed in more detail in another section, some
21
exceptions have emerged to the complete exclusivity of parenthood.
Nevertheless, barring special statutory provisions, non-parents are not held to
have any rights to visitation, constitutional or otherwise.
When non-parents seek to protect their interests in a relationship with a
child by making a claim for visitation, they often encounter the countervailing
(constitutional) rights of parents. The United States Constitution has long been
construed to protect parents’ exclusive authority to make childrearing
22
decisions, including the right to decide with whom their children shall
23
associate. Legally, non-parents are often considered “outsiders” who threaten
the parent-child relationship. Non-parents may be characterized as “third
parties” and even “strangers” to a child, especially when the legal system
24
assesses their request for visitation. This understanding involves implications
for their visitation claims as well because, under the Constitution, a right to

18. See infra note 22.
19. See infra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
20. Bartlett, supra note 3, at 883.
21. See infra section 3.A.
22. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 234 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 535 (1925).
23. The paradigmatic example is, of course, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). For a
detailed discussion of Troxel, see infra notes 48–57 and accompanying text.
24. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents'
Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1786 n. 150 (1993). The terms "third party" or "stranger" denote
disconnection, detachment, and even a threat. In reality, however, many of those referred to as "third
parties" and "strangers" are hardly detached from the child's life. Thus, for instance, the term
"strangers" was used to describe grandparents. Id. It has also been used to describe a surrogate
mother. Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions about Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REV. 637, 684–
85 (1993). On these grounds, I have chosen to use the term "non parents."
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privacy is recognized in families and in the parent-child relationship, giving
25
them a private realm that cannot be entered. The Constitution, then, has also
been interpreted as providing shelter to the parent-child relationship by creating
26
a boundary that protects parents and their children from outside interference.
III. CHALLENGING TRADITIONAL VISITATION RULES
The last decades of the twentieth century witnessed growing unease with
traditional legal conceptions of family and parenthood, including traditional
visitation laws. The main reason for the ongoing discontent with existing laws
has been the changing reality of the American family, partly due to changes in
social norms: the high rate of divorce, the growing numbers of blended (or
“step”) families and of single-parent families, the increase in the proportion of
children born outside of marriage, and the emergence of new gay and lesbian
27
families. In addition, advancements in medical technology have radically
expanded the range of procreative possibilities, undermining traditional
28
conceptions of procreation and parenthood.
This confluence of changing social norms and advancement in reproductive
technologies has had a tremendous effect on the family relationships between
children and adults. An ever increasing number of children have begun to form
strong and meaningful attachments with adults who are not legally recognized
as their parents, and these relationships have challenged the legal system in a
29
multitude of ways. With visitation defined as a parental right and parenthood
as exclusive, these relationships between children and non-parental adults have
been denied recognition and protection under the law. Stepparents, partners of

25. See, e.g., Prince, 321 U.S. at 166; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
26. Prior to Troxel, several state courts found that third party visitations violated family privacy.
See, e.g. Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tenn. 1993). The plurality's decision in Troxel, however,
was not founded on the parents' or the family's right to privacy but on the parental autonomy to
make childrearing decisions. See infra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. Jennifer Nedelsky is
critical of the notion of legal rights as boundaries and of this understanding of the right to privacy in
particular. According to Nedelsky, this view depicts the self as bounded and fosters independence
and selfishness rather than interdependence and connectedness. Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries,
and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162, 183–84 (1990). Nedelsky's critique, however, does not
fully take into account the role of rights as boundaries around groups and, particularly, intimate
groups such as the family. Ferdinand Schoeman, for example, argues that boundaries protecting
relationships from intrusion are essential for the very possibility of intimate relationships.
Boundaries, according to Schoeman, enable and foster the creation of a safe environment enabling
individuals to expose and share their selves with each other. In his view, the notion of intimacy
provides the basis for according the family a right to privacy. Ferdinand Schoeman, Rights of
Children, Rights of Parents, and the Moral Basis of the Family, 91 ETHICS 6, 14–15 (1980). Elsewhere, I
criticize the notion of rights as establishing boundaries, even around the family.
27. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64. These variant family patterns are grouped under the category of
"nontraditional" families. This term, however, is misleading, for it is used to describe all family
patterns that depart from the model of the nuclear family, although they have in fact existed
throughout human history. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "It All Depends on What You Mean by
Home": Toward a Communitarian Theory of the "Nontraditional Family," 1996 UTAH L. REV. 569, 570.
28. In particular, artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Law
Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 835, 837–42 (2000).
29. Bartlett, supra note 3, at 883.

BLECHER__FINAL.DOC

2/2/2009 2:59:08 PM

RETHINKING VISITATION: FROM A PARENTAL TO A RELATIONAL RIGHT

7

legal parents, grandparents, surrogate mothers, foster-parents—all have sought
and generally failed to protect their interest in continuing their relationships
30
with children by claiming visitation rights. Their stories exemplify the everincreasing disjunction between the new reality of people’s lives and the
31
dominant legal norms, and have captured public as well as academic attention.
When legal rules cease to relate to people’s actual lives, their justification is
significantly undermined, hence the extensive criticism of family law in general
32
and of existing visitation laws in particular. The law’s failure to protect the
meaningful relationships shared by children and adults and its seeming
disregard for their respective relational interests have yielded various proposals
for its modification. In all fifty states, legislative and judicial initiatives have
33
attempted to adapt the law to “the changing realities of the American family.”
The main change adopted in the various reforms has been the erosion of
parental exclusivity concerning visitation and the recognition of visitation rights
for various non-parents. This move has generated an intense debate, which is
still ongoing: How can parental authority on child-rearing decisions be
reconciled with the associational interests of both children and adults and with
the best interest of the child standard? What place is there for parental
exclusivity in the changing reality of family life? Whose interest in access to the
child should be legally recognized and protected? What should be the basis for
recognizing individuals’ visitation rights?
These and various other dilemmas remain unresolved. In the following
sections, this article reviews the legal reforms and the legal chaos surrounding
visitation issues, which culminated in Troxel v. Granville and suggest that the

30. See, e.g. Cox v. Williams, 502 N.W.2d 128, 131 (Wisc. 1993) (holding that a former stepparent
did not have standing to petition for visitation); Pierce v. Pierce, 645 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Mont. 1982)
(holding that a step-father could not adopt his step-child by "equitable adoption" and his parental
rights terminated at the dissolution of the marriage); Worrell v. Elkhart County Office of Families &
Children, 704 N.E.2d 1027, 1028 (Ind. 1998) (holding that former foster parents lacked standing to
seek visitation with former foster child); In re Melissa M., 421 N.Y.S.2d 300, 304 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1979)
(holding that former foster parents denied visitation rights after child was returned to biological
father and stepmother); In re Corey Richardson, 53 Va. Cir. 128, 133 (Va. Cir. 2000) (denying former
foster parents visitation rights after biological father regained custody); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572
N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (denying lesbian co-mother visitation after the relationship with the
biological mother had ended); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782–83 (Cal. 1993) (denying legal
rights for relationship with a child from a surrogate mother after deciding that legally, she was not
the child's mother).
31. The literature on these questions is particularly extensive. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 3;
Alison Harvison Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigm of the Exclusive Family, 6
AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW 505, 505 (1998); Dwyer, supra note 8; Kimberly P. Carr, Alison D. v. Virginia
M.: Neglecting the Best Interest of the Child in a Nontraditional Family, 58 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1021, 1021
(1992); Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family Values: The Case of Gay and Lesbian Families, 18
CARDOZO L. REV. 1299, 1299 (1997); Gilbert G. Holmes, The Tie that Binds: The Constitutional Right of
Children to Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 358 (1994); Alexa E.
King, Solomon Revisited: Assigning Parenthood in the Context of Collaborative Reproduction, 5 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 329, 329 (1995); Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to
a Care-Based Standard, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 83, 83 (2004).
32. See generally, supra note 31.
33. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000).
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turmoil and the impasse on the visitation issue can be attributed to the lack of an
underlying theory of visitation.
IV. THE VISITATION DEBATE
A. The Disarray in Third-Party Visitation Statutes
Recognizing the changes affecting the American family, the legal system
began to deviate from parental exclusivity on the issue of visitation and to
acknowledge relationships between children and non-parents, inter alia, by
enacting various third-party visitation statutes. Like most matters of family law,
visitation issues are subject to state discretion, and all states have indeed
34
recognized some form of third party visitation. The common denominator of
all the different statutes is the perception of visitation as a parental right. When
recognized, visitation by non-parents is regarded as the exception. Except for
this feature, however, the statutes and the case law concerning non-parents’
visitation are “dazzlingly varied,” and even a cursory review of them is
35
sufficient to reveal vast inconsistencies and confusion.
States diverge significantly as to who may be entitled to visitation rights.
Although every state has enacted legislation according some visitation rights to
grandparents, the circumstances under which visitation will be granted differ
36
significantly from state to state. Only about one-third of states provide for
visitation by stepparents in their legislation, either expressly or in language that
37
is broad enough to include them, and state courts addressing visitation rights
38
of stepparents have arrived at different conclusions. The uncertainty and lack
of consistency intensify with regard to other interested parties, such as foster
parents, siblings, uncles, and cousins. Such interested parties have rarely been
accorded visitation rights in states’ legislation, and the courts have varied
39
widely on whether they should be.
34. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73 n.1.
35. John DeWitt Gregory, Family Privacy and the Custody and Visitation Rights of Adult Outsiders,
36 FAM. L.Q. 163, 168 (2002); Developments in the Law: IV. Changing Realities of Parenthood: The Law's
Response to the Evolving American Family and Emerging Reproductive Technologies, 116 HARV. L. REV.
2052, 2054 (2003) [hereinafter Changing Realities of Parenthood].
36. Michael E. Ratner, Note: In the Aftermath of Troxel v. Granville: Is Mediation the Answer?, 39
FAM. CT. REV. 454, 455 (2001); Anne Marie Jackson, The Coming of Age of Grandparent Visitation Rights,
43 AM. U. L. REV. 563, 569 (1994); Christopher M. Bikus, Note, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, 75
NEB. L. REV. 288, 293 (1996); John Dewitt Gregory, Blood Ties: a Rationale for Child Visitation by Legal
Strangers, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351, 369–71 (1998); Michael Quintal, Note, Court-ordered Families: an
Overview of Grandparent-visitation Statutes, 29 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 835, 835 (1995).
37. Gregory, supra note 35, at 361.
38. Compare Finck v. O'Toole, 880 P.2d 624, 628 (Ariz. 1994) (en banc) (holding that stepparents
lack standing to seek visitation) with Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 477 N.W.2d 8, 17 (Neb. 1991)
(allowing the award of visitation to a stepparent), and Rhinehart v. Nowlin, 805 P.2d 88, 98–99 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1990) (denying visitation to a stepparent due to hostile circumstances). See also Gregory,
supra note 35, at 360–67; Diane L. Abraham, California's Stepparent Visitation Statute, 7 S. CAL. REV. L.
& WOMEN'S STUD. 125 (1997).
39. Lewinski, supra note 11, at 195. For state differences concerning foster parents, see, e.g.,
Gregory, supra note 35, at 367–69. Regarding siblings visitation, compare State ex rel. Noonan v.
Noonan, 547 N.Y.S.2d 525, 527 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (holding that half-siblings have standing to seek
visitation) with Ken R. v Arthur Z., 682 A.2d 1267, 1269 (Pa. 1996) (holding that a sibling lacks
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State laws, however, differ not only on who may seek visitation, but also
regarding the circumstances in which visitation rights should be granted to non40
parents and on the substantive standards that should govern the decision. To
give but a few examples: states differ on whether or not a disruption in family
relations in the form of death or divorce is a precondition for awarding
visitation to non-parents, or whether other requirements, such as mediation,
41
should also be met prior to such a decision. Visitation laws are indeed as varied
as the different states, and the prevalent confusion is also evident in the frequent
42
changes various states make in third-party visitation laws.
Differences in third-party visitations laws between states are not
intrinsically problematic and do not constitute a violation of “integrity,” in
43
Dworkin’s terms. Family matters always involve conflicting interests and
policy considerations. Whenever children are concerned, emotions also tend to
run high. Varied political and social forces have also influenced state legislation
44
on visitation. With so many interests, policy considerations, and emotions at
play, and with intuitions pointing in conflicting directions, it is not surprising
that people disagree on what the law should be and only plausible, and even
inevitable, that different states should have developed different non-parents’
visitation regimes.
This article’s critique, then, does not target the variance in visitation rules
for non-parents, although this fact alone can cause great uncertainty to family

standing to seek visitation). Regarding aunts, uncles, and cousins, compare Youmans v. Ramos, 711
N.E.2D 165, 174 (Mass. 1999) (holding that an aunt who acted as a de facto parent has standing to
obtain visitation) and MacDonald v. Quaglia, 658 A.2d 1343, 1346 (Pa. Super Ct. 1995) (granting a
cousin visitation) with In re Katrina E., 636 N.Y.S.2d 53, 53 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (holding that an
aunt and uncle have no standing to sue for visitation).
40. Russell M. Coombs, Child Custody and Visitation by Non-Parents Under the New Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act: A Rerun of Seize-and-Run, 16 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL
LAW 1, 13–14 (1999).
41. Most states do condition non-parents visitation on a prior disruption of family life and are
reluctant to award visitation over objection of parents in intact nuclear families. See, e.g. Gregory,
supra note 35, at 168. For states awarding grandparents visitation in cases of dissolution of the
relationship between the child's parents, or in cases of death of a parent or parents of the child, see,
e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 119, § 39D (2000); MINN. STAT. § 257C.08 (2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 431802(1)(a) (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125C.050(1)(2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.11 (West Supp.
2003); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5311 (West 2001).
42. Coombs, supra note 40, at 14. See also Patricia S. Fernandez, The Status of Grandparents'
Visitation Rights in Massachusetts, 40 BOSTON B.J. 6, 6 (1996) (stating that the grandparent visitation
statute in Massachusetts was amended a number of times between 1972 and 1996); Weathers v.
Compton, 723 So. 2d 1284, 1285 (Ala. Ct. Civ, App. 1998) (summarizing frequent amendments of
Alabama's grandparent visitation law).
43. "Integrity holds within political communities, not among them. . . . The American
Constitution provides a federal system: it recognizes states as distinct political communities and
assigns them sovereignty over many issues of principle. So there is no violation of political integrity
in the fact that the tort laws of some states differ from those of others even over matters of principle."
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 185–86 (1986).
44. Third party visitation statutes, and particularly statutes awarding visitation rights to
grandparents , were pushed by powerful lobbies, including the AARP (formerly known as the
American Association of Retired Persons). Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral
in the Mess?, 102 COLUM L. REV. 337, 372 (2002).
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members. The objection is to the lack of any principle or theory underlying the
current variations of visitation laws among states. Statutes and case law on this
issue were triggered by the rapidly changing social reality and by the pressures
exerted by various political groups. Instead of developing these changes on
solid theoretical grounds, stating the nature of visitation rights, the values that
should underlie them, and how to reconcile these rights with parental authority,
46
these changes seem like erratic, ad hoc responses to perceived injustices.
Hence, they fail to offer a calculated and coherent scheme that could serve as a
basis for alternative jurisprudence. This disarray is evident in Troxel v.
47
Granville, the 2000 Supreme Court ruling that addressed the constitutionality of
third party visitation statutes.
B. Troxel v. Granville and Its Aftermath
The extent to which third party visitation statutes infringe the
constitutional rights of parents to make child rearing decisions has long been a
48
contested issue. Although various state supreme courts reached mixed rulings
49
on this question during the 1990s, the Supreme Court had denied review of
50
cases involving third-party visitation prior to granting certiorari in Troxel. The
Court’s decision to hear Troxel, therefore, generated expectations that the ruling
would clarify some of the concerns pertaining to this issue. These expectations,
however, were to be disappointed.
The statute under consideration at Troxel was a law permitting “any
person” to petition for visitation rights “at any time,” whenever such visitation
51
was seen to be in the child’s best interest. Acting under this statute, a family
court judge ordered the broadening of visitation rights granted to the children’s
paternal grandparents, contrary to the wishes of the children’s mother.
The Court issued no majority opinion in this case. The Court was deeply
split and issued six separate opinions. The Justices disagreed about whether the
case should have been granted certiorari and, if so, whether it should have been
45. See, e.g., Coombs, supra note 40, at 13–17.
46. The confusion and absence of a coherent and principled jurisprudence are evident not only
on visitation issues but on family matters in general. See Dolgin, supra note 44.
47. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
48. Changing Realities of Parenthood, supra note 35, at 2056.
49. Compare Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271, 1276 (Fla. 1996) (holding that when a child was
living with both natural parents, and at least one parent objected to the visitation, the grandparent
visitation statute violated an otherwise fit parent's " fundamental right to raise their children" );
Herbst v. Sayre, 971 P.2d 395, 395 (Okla. 1998) (holding that a grandparent visitation statute allowing
disruption of an intact nuclear family against the wishes of both parents , was unconstitutional as
applied because it violated the parents' rights to the custody and management of their minor child);
Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 573 (Tenn. 1993) (holding that a showing of harm is necessary
before visitation rights may be granted to non-parents) and Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 773
(Ga. 1995) (holding that grandparents' visitation must be limited to instances where "failing to do so
would be harmful to the child") with King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 630 (Ky. 1992) (holding that
grandparent visitation did not violate parental rights) and Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 209
(Mo. 1993) (holding that granting grandparents visitation rights for the best interests of the child
was constitutional).
50. See, e.g. King, 828 S.W.2d at 630; H.F. v. T.F., 483 N.W.2d 803 (Wis. 1992).
51. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (2000) (citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60).
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considered as a facial or an as-applied challenge; about the scope, if any, of the
proper constitutional protection accorded to parental rights; about whose
52
interests should have been considered; and about various additional matters.
Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion, joined by three other Justices, digressed to
fact-specific grounds and concluded that, on the facts of the case, the
Washington family court had failed to show adequate deference for the mother’s
53
decision.
The lack of a majority, the multiplicity of opinions, and the confusion
characterizing each opinion have provided fertile ground for diverse and even
contradictory interpretations of Troxel. Indeed, non-parental visitation cases
attempting to follow the Troxel precedent are mixed and confused. Courts in
different states have interpreted Troxel differently and even within states,
variant understandings of Troxel have led to contradictory rulings as to the
54
constitutionality of state statutes. Troxel has also proven a rich vein for
55
extensive academic attempts to discern the case’s meaning and implications.
Not surprisingly, these scholarly analyses also offer contradictory readings of
56
the case and its various opinions. In many respects, Troxel seems to have only
57
triggered further doubts regarding non-parents’ visitation rights. The
confusion exposed in Troxel is exacerbated by the perplexity surrounding the
meaning of legal parenthood.
C. The Malleability of Parental Status
The swift and extensive changes in family patterns and norms over the last
decades have significantly challenged traditional conceptions of parenthood.
Thus far, current law has failed to keep up with changing social norms and biotechnological changes; it has not produced clear and stable new principles by
which legal parenthood can be determined. Questions about motherhood and
fatherhood in cases of surrogacy, sperm donation, same-sex families, children

52. Martin Guggenheim, however, contends that "the Court was in considerably more
substantive agreement on the basic constitutional issues concerning third-party visitation statutes
than is apparent from the number of opinions filed and the inability of any one opinion to capture a
majority of views." Martin Guggenheim, The Making of the Model Third-Party (Non-Parental) Contact
Statute: The Reporter's Perspective, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 15, 20 (2002).
53. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer joined Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000).
54. See, e.g., Dolgin, supra note 44, at 396–401 (reviewing conflicting cases from New York and
California); Kristine L. Roberts, State Supreme Court Applications of Troxel v. Granville and the Courts'
Reluctance to Declare Grandparent Visitation Statutes Unconstitutional, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 14 (2003)
(reviewing post-Troxel case law from different states, including Maine, West Virginia, Mississippi,
Kansas, Iowa, and Oklahoma); Dwyer, supra note 8, at 977–84.
55. A recent Lexis search found 870 references to Troxel in the "US & Canadian Law Reviews,
Combined" database, of which at least 202 seem to undertake an in-depth analysis of the case
(addressing it at least ten times in their text).
56. Compare, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 8, at 978 (interpreting the case as clearly having "put the
breaks on the trend toward expansion of third-party visitation") with Changing Realities of Parenthood,
supra note 35, at 2057–58 (interpreting Troxel as implicitly endorsing non-parents' visitation rights:
"By leaving in place only a hazy presumption that parents act in the best interests of their children,
the plurality has allowed plenty of room for states to grant [visitation] rights to non-parents[.]").
57. For an in-depth analysis of Troxel, see Dolgin, supra note 44.
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born out of wedlock, and other family situations still occupy legislators and
58
judges. The problem of deciding who is a parent carries significant implications
for visitation issues. Since visitation is considered a parental right, deciding
whether a claimant for visitation is a parent and thus prima facie entitled to
visitation, or a non-parent and thus generally not entitled to this right, is key to
determining visitation rights. Given that legal parenthood is fluid, open, and
indeterminate, distinguishing claimants who are parents from claimants who
are non-parents can be complicated.
The difficulty of determining who exactly is a “parent” has negative
implications for legal predictability. Also, the indeterminacy of legal parenthood
broadens and distorts the scope of visitation issues. Claimants for visitation,
particularly in non-traditional family situations, are encouraged to state their
claim as one of visitation by parents, thus requiring consideration of their legal
status as “parents.” Two telling, highly publicized examples are the Supreme
59
Court case of Quilloin v. Walcott and the New York case of Thomas S. v. Robin
60
Y.
The common features of these different cases concern a biological male
progenitor who maintained an ongoing relationship with the child, but neither
initiated nor showed interest in initiating legal proceedings to be recognized as
the child’s legal father. After the relationship had continued for several years,
61
access to the child was denied by the mother, who was the legal parent. Only
when access to the child was denied (in both cases when the child was
approximately twelve years old) and the men were compelled to seek access
through rights of visitation, did they initiate proceedings to be legally
62
recognized as the children’s respective fathers. In Thomas S. in particular, it was
evident that Thomas’ sole concern was to continue his relationship with the
child, Ry. Since the claimants’ prospects of being awarded visitation rights as
non-parents were almost non-existent, they had to take their chances on a
63
paternity claim, which is far broader and substantially different.

58. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 110 (1989); Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660,
660 (Cal. 2005); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 539 (N.J. 2000); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 959
(R.I. 2000); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 776 (Cal. 1993); Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 599 N.Y.S. 2d 377,
377 (Fam. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994).
59. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
60. 599 N.Y.S. 2d 377 (Fam. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994).
61. Id. In Thomas S., the child lived with two lesbian mothers, and both were opposed to the
child's continued contact with Thomas. Under the law, however, only the biological mother was
considered a legal parent authorized to make decisions as to who should be allowed to associate
with the child.
62. In Quilloin, the mother's husband wanted to adopt the child and the couple found that
contact with Quilloin was disruptive. See infra notes 104–108 and accompanying text. In Thomas S.,
access to the child was denied following a deterioration of the relationship between Thomas and the
child's two lesbian mothers. 618 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
63. Indeed, once his status as father was not recognized by the Supreme Court, Quilloin's claim
for visitation was succinctly denied. Quillion, 434 U.S. at 255. So was the claim of Thomas S.,
according to the New York family court's decision that was reversed on appeal. Thomas S., 618
N.Y.S.2d at 358. Another example often cited, which broadens and distorts the dispute, is Michael H.
v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). See infra notes 114–118 and accompanying text.
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Disputes over visitation thus become distorted into battles about who the
child’s parents really are and slide into demands for parental rights in toto,
including custody, thereby muddling significant questions. Instead of
considering whether the nature of the relationship between the claimant and the
child justifies awarding visitation rights, and the potential implications of
awarding visitation rights for the child’s relationship with her custodians, the
courts enter a debate about a different and larger issue: what makes one a
64
parent.
Another consequence of the confused meanings of legal parenthood is that
it is subject to manipulation. Legal parenthood can easily be interpreted in ways
that fit a desired outcome, including but not limited to visitation issues. A
claimant adjudged to be worthy of visitation can be legally recognized as a
parent and vice-versa; parental status can be denied to block visitation.
Visitation, then, is not only derivative from prior recognition of legal
65
parenthood but is also a factor in determining it. The New York family court
decision in Thomas S. again provides an example. Judge Kaufmann denied
Thomas’s paternity claim because he found that compulsory visitation between
him and the child, Ry, would be harmful to the child by destabilizing her family
66
unit and undermining her relationship with her two mothers and her sister.
Although these concerns may have been real and may have justified denying
Thomas rights of visitation, they are (or should be) unrelated to the question of
paternal status. This was indeed the point asserted by the appellate court, which
reversed the decision and held that the benefit or harm to Ry as a result of
Thomas’s visitation was irrelevant to his paternity claim. These considerations,
the appellate court held, could and should be addressed under the best interest
of the child standard when considering Thomas’s request for visitation (as a
67
father).
The appellate court’s argument that the potential impact of Thomas’s
visitation was irrelevant to his paternity claim is in principle correct. Courts are
64. Whereas in Quilloin the child explicitly stated a wish to continue visitations with Quilloin, in
Thomas S., the child expressed anxiety about continued visitations. As noted, both children were
approximately twelve years old and thus of an age where their wishes should be considered. Once
Quilloin was denied paternal status, however, the almost automatic result was the denial of
visitation. The visitation question was not considered per se. Thomas S., on the other hand, was
eventually recognized as the legal father, and although the appellate court stated that visitation was
to be considered separately, it was obvious that a paternity determination also determined that
visitation would take place. Thomas S., however, stopped the contest at this point and did not
pursue his visitation rights. Susan Dominus, Growing Up with Mom & Mom, N.Y. TIMES, October 24,
2004, 6 (magazine) at 69 (an interview with the child, Ry, at the age of 22).
65. The idea of rights considered parental is that legal parenthood is a given and that all rights,
duties, and obligations considered parental follow and are simply attached to the legal parent. For a
critique of this idea, see infra notes 102, 152, and accompanying text.
66. Legally, Ry had no sister and only one (biological) mother. Judge Kaufmann's decision was
at first indeed celebrated in lesbian circles for recognizing non-biological ties in lesbian families,
adopting a functional approach to legal parenthood and family. But misgivings have been raised as
to whether the functional approach really achieves what it attempts to do. See, e.g., Brad Sears,
Winning Arguments/Losing Themselves: The (Dys)Functional Approach in Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 29
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 559, 566–74 (1994); Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family Values: The
Case of Gay and Lesbian Families, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1299, 1324 (1997).
67. Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 362 (App. Div. 1994).
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indeed required to determine visitation with parents guided by the best interest
of the child. But parents’ rights of visitation, as noted, are firm and denied only
68
under extreme circumstances. Under current law, then, denying visitation
rights to protect a child from potential harm to her and her family requires us to
69
negate the claimant’s paternity.
The malleability of legal parenthood, then, together with the prevalent
understanding of visitation as a parental right, opens the way for the improper
70
conflation of questions concerning visitation and legal parenthood. The move
toward recognition of third party visitation was supposed to alleviate the
improper conflation of issues, as it enables claimants to make a claim for
71
visitation without being recognized as parents. Nonetheless, and especially
following Troxel, visitation by non-parents is still an exception whereas
visitation by parents is the well established rule. As long as visitation is
understood as a parental right, then, questions of visitation and questions
concerning parenthood will remain entangled.
This is also evident in the use of such notions as de facto parentage,
psychological parenting, or functional parenthood. These notions were
developed in response to the changing reality of parenthood and child-adult
familial relationship, and they enable the conferral of rights considered parental
upon individuals who are not legally recognized as parents. As these notions
suggest, although these individual claimants are not legally recognized as
parents, they should be. Janet Dolgin offers recent examples of state courts using
concepts such as de facto parentage or psychological parentage to award
visitation rights to claimants by distinguishing these cases from Troxel, which
had purportedly addressed the visitation rights of non-parents who did not
72
function as parents. These notions do blur the once clear line dividing parents
from non-parents, but they re-establish the understanding of visitation as a
parental right and its connection to all other rights considered parental.
Individuals recognized as de facto, functional, or psychological parents can
make a claim for all rights considered parental, not only to visitation. A
visitation claim submitted by a de facto, functional, or psychological parent can,
73
just like a paternity claim, reopen the way to a claim for parental rights in toto.

68. See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text.
69. Karen Czapanskiy, Interdependencies, Families, and Children, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 957,
1008 (1999).
70. As in Quilloin and in Michael H., denying paternity in these cases was also meant to enable
another man to assume the role of legal parent through adoption or the presumption of paternity,
not only to block visitation. The malleability of legal parenthood, however, again enabled the Court
to reach the desired outcome. The focus tends to be on the family rather than on the individual child,
especially if the case concerns a traditional nuclear model. See infra notes 102–122 and accompanying
text.
71. Sears, supra note 66, at 575.
72. Dolgin, supra note 44, at 401–04, referring mainly to Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 303
(Me. 2000) and Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 969 (R.I. 2000).
73. See infra notes 165 and 166 and accompanying text.
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D. Reformulating the Question as a Way Out of the Maze
The disarray of third party visitation status and the Supreme Court’s
confusion in Troxel reveal the absence of an underlying theory of visitation that
would specify the interests and values that a right to visitation should aim to
protect. Furthermore, as long as parental status is the main distinguishing factor
between visitation claimants, the malleability of legal parenthood and concepts
such as de facto parenthood compound the current confusion about visitation
rights, especially by non-parents. It also clouds the real questions that should be
debated concerning these rights, and thus thwarts the development of a theory
of visitation.
In developing a comprehensive theory of visitation, it should not be
assumed that visitation is a parental right. Rather than asking why only the
parents’ interests in their relationship with their children should be protected,
this article challenges the basic assumptions of the existing laws and asks
instead how rights of visitation should be understood and what should be the
basis for recognizing such rights.
V. VISITATION AS A PARENTAL RIGHT: AN ADEQUATE CONSTRUCT?
The primary consideration in awarding visitation, from the children’s
perspective, is to maintain the continuity of meaningful relationships in their
lives. Further, when adults are concerned, awarding visitation should primarily
reward nurture and care for children rather than the biological relationship of
the adult to the child. Visitation conceived as a parental right marginalizes both
the children’s relational interests and the nurture and care of children. It instead
emphasizes considerations such as biology that, while not entirely irrelevant,
should be secondary in constructing a right to visitation. The emphasis on
biology and parental status leaves room for remnants of the perception of
children as their parents’ property and policy considerations that elevate
marriage and the nuclear family as superior institutions.
Questioning the prevalent understanding of visitation as a parental right
does not suggest that parents are not normally entitled to visitation or do not
have a special relationship with their children that is qualitatively different from
the relationships children have with grandparents, stepparents, and other
relatives. By the theory presented in this article most parents would still be
entitled to visitation rights. The basis for this entitlement, however, would be
their active role as parents in nurturing and caring for their children rather than
their parental status.
A. Children’s Relational Interests
In light of the central role that children’s interests should play in
constructing the legal rules that affect them, this section begins the case against
the conception of visitation as a parental right by discussing children’s interests
in the issue of visitation. Talking about children’s interests in order to challenge
(and even more so in order to justify) adults’ rights requires a short pause.
Children’s interests can and often should be protected through children’s own
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rights. Recognizing children’s rights, however, does not preclude recognizing
adults’ rights in relation to children. If we cherish children’s interests, however,
we should guarantee that when there are available two alternative legal models
for recognizing adults’ interests and protecting them through rights, the
75
preferable one is the one more compatible with children’s interests.
The current consensus on children’s relational interests is that children can
form multiple relationships, which are essential for their social developmental
needs. Time with legal parents is insufficient to meet those needs, and
grandparents, other adult relatives, stepparents, and other adults play roles in
children’s lives. When all the relationships a child enjoys are consensual, a child
76
will only benefit from this broad web of multiple relationships. Dilemmas arise
when one of the child’s existing or potential relationships is not welcomed by
the child’s custodial parent, creating a situation that will lead to a demand for
visitation rights.
77
Two less than ideal alternatives exist in these cases. The first is to maintain
the multiple relationships in the child’s life while exposing her to conflict and
78
burdening her relationship with her custodian. The second is to preserve a

74. See, e.g., JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (2006). While recognizing
children's relationship rights, Dwyer does not utterly reject various adults' right to spend time with a
child. Nonetheless he argues that such rights should be no different from rights adults have vis-à-vis
other adults, which are contingent on reciprocal choice to be supplied by a surrogate when children
are concerned.
75. Some even contend that adults are occasionally granted rights not in order to protect their
own interests, but rather to serve children's interests. Meir Dan-Cohen calls these derivative rights
because they are recognized in A out of concern for B. Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech:
A Theory of Protected Communications by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 CALIF. L. REV.
1229, 1233 (1991). Furthermore, some argue that recognizing adults' rights is sometimes a better way
of protecting children's interests, given that children depend on adults for the exercise of their rights
and thus become subject to abuse and manipulation. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (2005). Visitation is particularly conducive to the use of a children's rights
vocabulary to conceal adults' interests. Emily Buss, Children's Associational Rights?: Why Less is More,
11 WM & MARY BILL OF RTS J. 1101, 1102 (2003). I do not attempt to claim that adults' visitation rights
are merely derivative rights meant to secure children's interests. Rather my claim as stated in the text
is much more modest and merely offers to choose a model for adults' rights that is more compatible
with children's interests.
76. Even Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud and Albert Solnit, who are associated the most with the
position of securing one significant attachment for a child. See infra notes 79–83 and accompanying
text) acknowledged the desirability of multiple and varied bonds for children. Joseph Goldstein
indeed stated in an interview that "it is a misperception that we are talking about a single person.
Interview with Joseph Goldstein, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 575, 579 (1983–1984). Nonetheless,
the trio argued that the benefits a child acquires from multiple attachments are conditioned upon
positive relation—or at least the lack of hostility and negative relations—among the adults involved.
They thus emphasized that the existence of such a network of attachments, although it might and
even should be encouraged, must remain voluntary or consensual. See infra notes 81–83 and
accompanying text.
77. I follow Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's proposal to use the "least detrimental alternative" for
a child rather than the "best interests of the child" as a reminder of the limits of what can be attained
within the limits of the law. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 6 (2d ed. 1979).
78. Who, as recalled, is under a duty at least of not interfering in the relationship between the
child and the holder of visitation rights, and sometimes is even under a duty of cooperation. See text
accompanying supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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stable relationship with the custodian parent and allow additional relationships
only as approved by the child’s custodian.
Preference for stability in a child’s life based on protecting her relationship
with her custodian is the position that Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert
79
Solnit adopt. Their stance is also the most extreme, since they suggest that,
following divorce, even visitation rights of non-custodial parents should be
80
eliminated. They do not disregard the significance of the relationship between
children and their non-custodial parents. Indeed, their advice in situations of
divorce is to encourage custodial parents to facilitate visitation between the noncustodial parent and the child. They even suggest that, other things being equal,
courts should award custody to the parent most willing to provide the child
opportunities for contact with the other parent. They argue, however, that
children benefit from multiple ties on the condition that the relationships
between the adults involved are positive, or at least not hostile and negative.
In their view, any visitation the custodial parent considers undesirable may
expose the child to conflicting loyalties, compromise the intimacy between the
child and the custodial parent, and shatter the child’s required trust in the
81
parent’s autonomy when exercising control over the child’s life. Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit further contend that the threat that compulsory visitation
poses to the child’s relationship with her custodian is in no way offset by any of
visitation’s potential benefits, due to the limited relationship a child can form
82
with an individual who is merely visiting. They also argue that facilitating
children’s positive relationships with two people in conflict with one another is
83
beyond the courts’ capacity.
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit’s position is rather extreme, as noted, and
highly controversial in academic circles. Their numerous critics focus on the
benefits of maintaining multiple relationships in children’s lives, despite
potential conflicts. Studies conducted in various contexts point out the
79. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 77.
80. The anti-visitation proposal of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit relies mainly on the authors'
psychoanalytic theory of child development. Nonetheless, the authors' depiction of their work as
scientific has been heavily criticized. See, e.g., Daniel Katkin, Bruce Bullington & Murray Levine,
Above and Beyond the Best Interest of the Child: An Inquiry into the Relationship Between Social Science and
Social Action, 8 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 669, 672–73 (1974). The thrust of the argument against the
authors was that they had failed to provide empirical basis for their contentions. Id. See also Martha
L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policy Making: Custody Determinations
and Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 107, 145–46; Robert D. Felner & Stephanie S. Farber, Social Policy for
Child Custody: A Multidisciplinary Framework, 50 AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 341, 341 (1980); Michael
S. Wald, Thinking About Public Policy Toward Abuse and Neglect of Children: A Review of Before the Best
Interests of the Child, 78 MICH. L. REV. 645, 664 (1980); Peter L. Strauss & Joanna B. Strauss, Book
Review, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 996, 1002 (1974) (reviewing GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 77).
81. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 77, at 37–38. The authors qualify their argument to children
below the age of five or six at the time of parents' separation: "Once a child is past the age of five or
six, he may be unwilling to give up the relationship to a parent who has played a large part in his
early development. By that time he has outgrown his earlier unquestioning trust in parents, he has
learned to criticize, to take sides in quarrels, to begin to understand that parents in some way share
responsibility for the separation. In short, the progress in his cognitive capacity may help him with
his emotional difficulties inherent in the situation." Id. at 119.
82. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 77, at 38.
83. Id. at 117.
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significance of continued relationships in children’s lives, and the harmful
effects to the child of losing a significant relationship. Studies of families after
divorce show that maintaining ties with non-custodial parents through
84
visitation is highly significant for children. Data on foster placement and on the
adoption of older children also indicate that continued contact with the original
parents generally promotes the child’s sense of well-being and emotional
85
security. Cross-cultural research has expanded the framework of discussion,
pointing out that children form multiple attachments not only to parents but
also to psychological parents and to others who are members of their kin
86
groups. In various cultures, raising and caring for children is not the sole
responsibility of parents; grandparents and other relatives assume care giving
87
roles and thus play a significant role in a child’s life. In these various contexts
of analysis—divorce, foster care, adoption, and cultural scenarios—advocates of
expanding the web of relationships in children’s lives point to the potential
harm entailed by the loss of a meaningful relationship. They argue that it
exceeds the harm of a conflicting relationship and the potential harm to the
relationship between the child and her custodian.
For the purpose of this article, we do not need to take sides in this dilemma.
The relevant data are confused and unreliable, and probably no single answer
88
can contend with all cases. Advocates of maintaining multiple relationships in
children’s lives, inter alia by awarding rights of visitation, focus on the
continuity of meaningful relationships in children’s lives rather than on

84. The research most often cited in countering Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's argument against
post-divorce visitation is probably the long-term study conducted by clinical psychologist Judith
Wallerstein and her associates, tracking the effects of divorce on children. JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN &
JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: HOW CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE
(1980) [hereinafter SURVIVING THE BREAKUP]; JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND
CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE (1989) [hereinafter SECOND
CHANCES]; JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, THE GOOD MARRIAGE: HOW AND WHY
LOVE LASTS (1995) (Judith Wallerstein and Joan Kelly analyzed and reported the effects of divorce on
the lives of sixty divorced couples and their children, both at the time of marital breakup and at
subsequent intervals of eighteen months and five years. For our purposes, one of their main findings
concerned the importance for the child of a continued relationship with both parents following
divorce and the significance of visitation in this regard.). Subsequent studies, however, emphasized
the centrality to children's adjustment following divorce of the custodial parent-child relationship.
Judith S. Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: Psychological and Legal Considerations in
the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 FAM. L.Q. 305, 310–11 (1996).
85. Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights? 35 STAN. L. REV. 423, 461–63 (1983); David
Fanshel, Urging Restraint in Terminating the Rights of Parents of Children in Foster Care, 12 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 501, 502 (1984); Fernando Colon, Family Ties and Child Placement, 17 FAM. PROCESS
289, 290 (1978).
86. See, e.g., Carol B. Stack, Who Owns the Child? Divorce and Child Custody Decisions in MiddleClass Families, 23 SOC. PROB. 505, 506 (1976); Peggy Cooper Davis, The Good Mother: A New Look at
Psychological Parent Theory, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 347, 358–60 (1996); Carol B. Stack,
Cultural Perspectives on Child Welfare, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 539, 539 (1984).
87. See, e.g., Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn't Know Best: Quasi-Parents and
Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REV. 865, 907–08 (2003).
88. Even in a divorce context, where our strongest intuition suggests that the child's "best" and
not merely "least detrimental" alternative is to maintain contact with the non-custodial parent,
researchers admit that the question of whether a relationship with two antagonistic parents is better
than with one overburdened but stable one remains open. Felner & Farber, supra note 80, at 344.
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establishing new ones. From the perspective of children’s interests, then,
visitation laws should rely primarily on the existence or absence of a
89
relationship with the child.
B. The Inconsistency of the Legal Approach
In the prevalent perception of visitation as a parental right, non-parents are
generally denied visitation rights, even when visitation is meant to preserve an
ongoing relationship with a child. By contrast, “parents,” once legally defined
as such, are entitled to visitations even without any previous relationship with
the child. This legal distinction seems incompatible with the interest in
maintaining the continuity of meaningful relationships in children’s lives.
Furthermore, when visitation laws rely on parental status results are
inconsistent and incoherent. In some contexts the law supports multiple
relationships, even if they are conflicting. In other contexts the law supports
safeguarding one unconditional attachment for the child, even at the expense of
severing other relationships. When the claimant for visitation is a non-parent,
the law prefers to maintain one unconditional relationship with the child, and
views legally enforced visitation as an intrusion on the custodian-child
90
relationship. The law rejects this perception of visitation rights, however, when
the claimant is a legally recognized parent. Sustaining multiple, even conflicting,
attachments in children’s lives is viewed as the best, not just the least
91
detrimental, alternative when the child’s parents are involved.
The inconsistency, however, could be merely apparent. A distinction
between parents and non-parents seems entirely justified, since parents play the
most significant role in children’s lives. But parents are so significant because
most parents raise and nurture their children, not because of their parental
status. And yet, as discussed below, parental status cannot serve as a sufficiently
adequate proxy for significant relationships in children’s lives that should be
92
preserved through rights of visitation.
The seeming inconsistency evinced in the legal approach, however, goes
beyond the parent/non-parent distinction. Over two decades ago, Marsha

89. As I discuss in further detail below, I do not suggest that biology is utterly irrelevant to a
decision concerning visitation. A relationship with biological parents does seem to be significant to
children, though this significance might be socially constructed. Nonetheless, it is clear that
maintaining meaningful relationships based on daily caretaking of a child is more significant than
maintaining a relationship that is merely based on biological connection. This can be discerned, for
example, from the (indeed limited) experience with open adoption. The benefits of maintaining
contact with the biological parents were mainly shown in adoption of older children, who already
had some form of relationship with their biological parents. As to the adoption of infants, the harm
of conflict was more apparent. See, e.g., Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families through Adoption:
Implications for Collaborative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U.L. REV. 997, 1019 (1995). We should also
bear in mind that, in any event, open adoption where children may have some kind of contact with
their biological parents is primarily consensual; therefore, the issue of conflicting loyalties in this
context is rather limited.
90. This perception of non-parents' visitation is also evident in Troxel v. Granville. 530 U.S. 57, 57
(2000).
91. On the problematic distinction between "parents" and "non-parents," see supra Section 3.C.
92. See infra Section 5.B.
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93

Garrison recognized a further discrepancy. Garrison compared the widespread
legal acceptance of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit’s ideas in the contexts of foster
care and adoption with the extremely negative reaction to their ideas in the
94
context of divorce. In the context of long-term foster care and adoption, the
legal system embraced children’s need for an unconditional permanent
relationship and, upon children’s adoption, terminated the original parents’
parental rights, including visitation. In the post-divorce context, however, the
idea of one unconditional permanent relationship was fiercely rejected, and the
legal system endorsed children’s need for the continuity of familial
95
relationships. Children’s presumed legal need for a continuity of relationships
following divorce led not only to strong visitation rights of non-custodial
parents but also to the popularity of joint custody legislation in the late 1970s
96
and 1980s.
What makes Garrison’s comparison particularly interesting is that the
situations of post-divorce and of adoption after long-term foster care address the
visitation rights of parents who had lost custody of their children. Garrison
argued that children’s needs in both these contexts are similar, and she
97
questioned the law’s differential treatment of these situations. In the postdivorce situation, children and the parents who lose custody of them retain
contact through visitation rights whereas, following adoption, children lose
contact with their original parents, who are normally denied visitation rights.
In technical-legal terms, the post-divorce situation concerns parents’
visitation while the post-adoption situation concerns non-parents’ visitation,
since the adoption terminated the parental status and rights of the original
parents. But the title of Garrison’s article—“Why Terminate Parental Rights?”—
vividly pinpoints that legal parenthood is a human creation, and terminating
parental status is a decision rather than a given. Legal decisions cannot be made
by internal deduction from the legal concept of “parent.” Garrison’s research
highlights that classifying a claimant for visitation as parent or non-parent is
open and undetermined, all the more so given the upheaval in the traditional
98
legal definitions of motherhood, fatherhood, and parenthood in recent decades.

93. Garrison, supra note 85, at 461–63.
94. Id. at 450–53. See also Peggy C. Davis, "There's a Book Out . . .": An Analysis of Judicial
Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1587 (1987) (documenting the judiciary's
blanket acceptance of the arguments in GOLDSTEIN ET AL. in regard to child's placement disputes).
95. Garrison's purpose in demonstrating the law's inconsistency was to bolster her argument
against the termination of parental rights to allow post adoption visitation. Garrison, supra note 85,
at 455. Whereas Garrison sides with Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's critics and claims they were
wrong, I merely argue that it is inconsistent to adopt the critics' view on visitation with regards to
parents while endorsing Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's approach in the context of non-parents'
visitation. Hence, to the extent that the legal system recognizes visitation rights, it cannot do so on
the basis of the claimant's parental status.
96. See Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 466
(1984). Later experience, however, showed that, contrary to consensual arrangements, court ordered
joint custody is harmful to children's interests by exposing them to perpetual conflict. Id. at 487–95.
See also ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL
DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 284–85 (1992).
97. Garrison, supra note 85, at 461–63.
98. Infra Section 3.C.

BLECHER__FINAL.DOC

2/2/2009 2:59:08 PM

RETHINKING VISITATION: FROM A PARENTAL TO A RELATIONAL RIGHT

21

Indeed, the termination of parental rights usually follows a finding of
parental unfitness or unwillingness to parent, factors undoubtedly relevant
when considering whether to compel continued contact between the former
parent and the child. But even though the parental misconduct that served as a
basis for termination cannot be disregarded, the continuity of significant
relationships in children’s lives, if accepted as a primary consideration in
99
visitation decisions, cannot be dismissed either.
C. Protecting Marriage and Nuclear Families
Denying visitation to original parents in cases of adoption is justified on the
grounds of not disrupting or undermining the new family created by the
100
adoption. This rationale is endorsed regardless of the adopted children’s
previous attachment to their original parents. This approach affords a glimpse
into a key motive underlying the legal system’s visitation policy. Visitation
rules, including the general rule of denying the original parents’ visitation rights
upon a child’s adoption, probably center less on protecting the children’s
primary relationship with the custodial parents and more on preserving the
traditional model of the nuclear family and the institution of marriage. The
justification for denying visitation to original parents in cases of adoption is to
avoid interference with the new (nuclear) family, viewed as the ideal family
pattern, rather than merely to protect the children’s interests and their
relationships with their custodians.
This rationale can be discerned in other family situations as well. Thus, for
instance, preserving the traditional nuclear family was at the heart of the
Supreme Court decision in Quilloin, as well as in other cases known as the
101
“unwed fathers’ cases,” which culminated in the 1989 case of Michael H. v.
102
Gerald D. The circumstances of three of these cases concerned a child born out
99. An important reason for the law's resistance to order visitation with a parent whose
parental rights have been terminated is that that may be a deterrent to adoption for many potential
adopters. See text accompanying infra note 100.
100. See, e.g., 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption § 166; Matter of Adoption of RDS, 787 P.2d 968, 970 (Wyo.
1990); Matter of W.E.G., 710 P.2d 410, 415 (Alaska 1985); Marckwardt v. Superior Court, 150 Cal.
App. 3d 471, 480 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); See also, e.g., Matter of C.O.W., 519 A.2d 711, 714 (D.C. 1987);
Sanders v. Sanders, 498 So. 2d 1063, 1064 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986); Matter of C.P., 717 P.2d 1093 (Mont.
1986); In re Adoption of Dearing, 572 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978); Matter of Fox, 567 P.2d
985 (Okla. 1977); In re Adoption of Herbst, 217 Kan. 164 (Kan. 1975); Jouett v. Rhorer, 339 S.W.2d
865, 866 (Ky. 1960).
101. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). See also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989);
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972).
102. 491 U.S. at 110. Though Michael H. is perhaps the extreme example of how far the Court will
go to protect the nuclear family, the motivation of protecting nuclear families underlies all the cases
of unwed fathers. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 85 (1995). Prior to Michael H., the rule that seemed to
emerge from the Court as to the paternal status of unwed biological fathers allegedly focused on the
relationship of the child and the biological father. The Court stated that a biological father who has
established a substantial relationship with his children is legally a father, but it has been argued that
the real focus was on the relationship between the biological father and the mother and their
resemblance to the marital relationship. Fineman argues that, in fact, only when the biological father
had maintained a social relationship with the mother that resembled a traditional conjugal
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of wedlock, whose mother subsequently married a man who was not the
103
biological father and wanted to adopt the child. The adoption was dependent
upon a priori determination that the biological male progenitor was not the
child’s legal father, thus focusing on the paternal status of biological fathers of
children born out of wedlock. Another central issue, however, concerned the
very continuation of a relationship between the biological father and the child
through legal rights of visitations that, in turn, also depended on his parental
104
status.
Recognizing the biological father’s parental status, therefore, could impede
the adoption and hinder the creation of a traditional nuclear family for the child
by enabling the biological father to interfere with its functioning. These
considerations, as noted, affect the determination of parental status as well as
the more limited question of visitation. A critical view of the confluence of issues
in these cases, as well as of the influence of the wish to deny visitation on the
105
determination of denying paternity, was noted above. In three of these cases—
Michael H., Lehr, and Quilloin—the biological father was denied paternal status.
A supposedly unavoidable consequence was a denial of his claim for visitation
rights.
Resembling post-adoption situations, denying visitation to the biological
fathers in these cases might be theoretically justified for the purpose of securing
children a stable and unconditional relationship, as Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit
advocated. On closer scrutiny, however, it is obvious that underlying the legal
rules is not a child’s need for one unconditional relationship but rather the wish
to protect the family generally but more a specific ideal—that of the nuclear
family. Quilloin is a telling example.
In Quilloin, the mother’s husband, Walcott, wanted to adopt her son, who
was then approximately twelve years old and had an established relationship
106
with his biological father. Although the child expressed a desire to be adopted
by Walcott, he also clearly indicated that he wished to continue visitations with
Quilloin. The mother, however, argued that “these contacts were having a
107
disruptive effect on the child and on [the] . . . entire family.” In denying
Quilloin paternal status and affirming the adoption, the Supreme Court of
Georgia also succinctly denied the continuation of Quilloin’s visitations based
108
on the mother’s claim, and this decision was upheld in the Supreme Court.

relationship in a nuclear family was he recognized as a legal father. For a similar argument, see
Dolgin, supra note 24, at 654.
103. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645–46. (Although this is the first case that began this chain of cases, it is
an exception. Stanley was not a case of one man against another but a biological father against the
state.).
104. Three of the biological fathers, Quilloin, Caban, and Michael H., did not initiate paternity
proceedings until the pending adoption jeopardized their access to the child, suggesting they were
more interested in the rights to visitation than in the symbolic parental status.
105. See supra notes 55–68 and accompanying text.
106. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 251.
107. Id.
108. Id. Allegedly, that was an inevitable result of allowing the adoption. Id. at 251 n. 11.
However, it was already noted that terminating original parents' rights following a child's adoption
is a decision and not a given. See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text.
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Although the denial of Quilloin’s rights of visitation was seemingly meant to
protect the child from the visits’ disruptive effect, the son still expressly
indicated he wished them to continue. Obviously, had the mother and Quilloin
been married and divorced before the child’s birth, Quilloin would have been
the legal father and the mother’s claim to deny visitation could not have been
heard. In the typical case of a divorce followed by the mother’s remarriage, the
potential harm to the children from incompatible male authority figures,
persistent conflictual relationships, or disrupting the relationship with the
109
custodian could not be considered grounds for denying visitation. Moreover,
had the mother not married, the Court would probably have been unreceptive
to such a claim.
A more explicit instance of denying visitation through denial of paternal
110
status in order to protect the ideal of the nuclear family is Michael H. Michael
H. reached the United States Supreme Court after four prior cases in which the
Court seemed to have established clear conditions for recognizing an unwed
111
biological progenitor as a father. As in Quilloin, Michael’s immediate concern
was to ensure visitation rights with his daughter and thus protect his
112
relationship with her. The right to visitation thus stood at the heart of the legal
proceedings for paternity. Unlike Quilloin, Michael’s claim seemed quite strong,
since he seemed to satisfy all the conditions set in the precedents for legal
recognition as a father. He had lived with the child, recognized her as his
daughter, enjoyed a close and loving relationship with her, and clearly
demonstrated full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood—all shown
113
to be key factors in establishing legal fatherhood in prior cases. The Court
nevertheless denied Michael’s claim for paternal status, knowing that this would
114
end his attempts to establish visitation. The underlying reason was the
mother’s marriage to another man and the Court’s motivation to protect the
family unit, which might be jeopardized were Michael’s claim admitted. In
dismissing Michael’s claim, Justice Scalia explicitly stated that the motivation
behind this decision was to protect the unit “typified by the marital family,”

109. See, e.g. Pierce v. Yerkovich, 80 Misc. 2d 613, 622–24 (N.Y. Misc., 1974); Ireland v. Ireland,
246 Conn. 413, 442–43 (Conn. 1998).
110. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
111. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
112. At least according to the Court. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 118.
113. See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 256–63.
114. Theoretically, Michael could have sought visitation as a "non-parent." Section 4601 of the
California Civil Code Annotated (West Supp. 1989) provided that "[i]n the discretion of the court,
reasonable visitation rights may be granted to any other person having an interest in the welfare of
the child." Michael H., 491 U.S. at 144 (Stevens, J., concurring). This provision was indeed the basis
for Justice Stevens's concurring opinion, finding that the California statute had provided sufficient
protection to Michael's relationship with Victoria. Id. at 132–35. As Justice Brennan noted in his
dissent, however, this provision did not provide a real option for Michael to obtain visitation with
Victoria since, as interpreted by the California courts, a putative parent who cannot establish
paternity would not be able to obtain discretionary visitations as a non-parent. Id. at 148–50
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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which in this case consisted of the child, her mother, the mother’s husband and
115
two other children born to the couple.
Both Quilloin and Michael H. epitomize the centrality of protecting nuclear
families in visitation laws. Not only did the biological father and the child have
an established relationship (of twelve years in Quilloin), but it was also argued
that continuing the relationship was meaningful for the children as well (in
Michael H. by the guardian ad litem and in Quilloin by the child himself), but the
courts did not view this as sufficiently important.
This article does not argue that Quilloin and/or Michael should have been
116
awarded visitation rights. Maintaining relationships with the biological father
might indeed have been harmful to the child in either or both these cases,
through exposure to conflict or disruption of the primary relationship with the
custodial parent, as noted. These are genuine and valid concerns that the courts
could address. What remains unexplained is the complete absence of these
considerations, insofar as the legal system perceives them as valid, in postdivorce situations. Divorced fathers who had been legally married would not
find their visitation rights denied following the mother’s remarriage were the
mother to claim that visitation has a disruptive effect on the child and on her
new family. In fact, mothers who make such a claim in the name of the child
117
may be accused of alienating the child from the father and risk losing custody.
The reason is that marriage, just like the nuclear family, is a sacred institution
whose protection is an important goal of the law.
The motivation to preserve the ideal of the nuclear family can account for
other common aspects of visitation rules, which may appear baffling when
examined from the perspective of children’s relational interests. Thus, for
instance, a non-parent stands a better chance of having standing and being
awarded visitation rights if the child with whom visitation is sought was born
out of wedlock, the child’s parents are divorced, or one of the child’s parents has
118
died. When a child is part of an intact nuclear family, the likelihood that a non119
parent will be awarded visitation rights declines significantly. This distinction

115. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123 n.3.
116. Nor do I challenge or endorse the decision that, legally, they are not fathers. My interest in
this article is not in legal parenthood and in how it should be determined.
117. See, e.g., Ritch v. Ritch, 195 S.W.2d 205, 205–06 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946). See also, e.g., Ellis v.
Ellis, 952 So.2d 982 (Miss. App. 2006); Clark v. Smith, 720 N.E.2d 973 (Ohio App.3d 1998). Martha
Fineman has challenged the stereotype of mothers as vindictive and has called to recognize their
misogynous basis: "Most mothers love their children and would not willfully deprive them of
contact with a caring and responsible father. . . . By making these observations, I do not mean to
suggest that abuses never occur, but rather to point out that they are not typical, or even common."
Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decision
Making, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 766–67 (1988).
118. See, e.g., Stephen Elmo Averett, Grandparent Visitation Right Statutes, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 355,
357–67 (1999); Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn't Know Best: Quasi-Parents and
Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REV. 865, 873 (2003); Gregory, supra note 35, at
168; 69 A.L.R.5th 1 (1999).
119. Even in states where legislation is broad enough to award visitation when a nuclear family
is intact and state courts recognize their authority to award visitation over objection of parents in
intact traditional nuclear families, the actual chances of a non-parent to be awarded visitation are
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was endorsed and promoted by Katharine T. Bartlett, one of the first scholars to
120
advocate recognition of visitation rights to non-parents. This distinction
between intact nuclear families and other family patterns cannot be explained
by reference to children’s needs—be it the need for a stable unconditional
relationship with the custodial parent, the need for continued attachment in the
children’s lives, or any other relational values.
As for children’s need for uninterrupted relationships with their parents,
the rules resulting from the legal distinction between intact nuclear families and
families that have undergone a crisis are the opposite of the rules we might
expect. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit claimed that children’s need for stability is
121
greater following situations of family crisis. A child raised in an intact nuclear
family is part of a stable set of relationships, and thus seems subject to smaller
risk from exposure to a conflicting relationship outside the nuclear family. By
contrast, when the child’s relationship with the custodial parent is already
suffering due to a death or a disruption in amiable family relations, maintaining
a relationship with an individual who is in conflict with the custodian seems to
122
pose greater risk to the child.
Stability in children’s lives is indeed affected by larger social experiences,
beyond their relationships with their legal parents. Grandparents and other
members of the extended family play an important role in providing stability,
123
particularly at times of family crises such as divorce or death. But accounts of
these stabilizing effects refer to cases where these relationships had not been
rejected by the child’s custodian. The relationship between the child and her
124
custodian, as noted, is crucial to the child’s success in coping with these crises,
and these situations require particular sensitivity to refrain from burdening the
custodian-child relationship.
The legal distinction between different family patterns also remains
confusing when considered according to children’s need for continuity of
relationships. If this is the underlying rationale for awarding visitation rights,
children’s meaningful relationships should be protected whether or not they live
in a nuclear family. Here again, however, it seems that the legal policy is not
motivated by children’s relational interests but rather by a wish to uphold
nuclear families as the preferred family pattern. Intact nuclear families are
entitled to legal protection from visitation rights, which are perceived as
125
interferences.

significantly lower. See, e.g., Doe v. Smith, 595 N.Y.S.2d 624, 625 (Fam. Ct. 1993); Coulter v. Barber,
632 N.Y.S.2d 270, 271 (App. Div. 1995).
120. Bartlett, supra note 3.
121. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 77, at 117–18. Their critics did not challenge them on this point
or on the destabilizing effect of court ordered visitation, only on the weight they attributed to this
matter.
122. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 77, at 118.
123. See e.g., Peter A. Zablotsky, To Grandmother's House We Go: Grandparent Visitation After
Stepparent Adoption, 32 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 43 (1985).
124. See, e.g., Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 84.
125. Troxel may seem to rebut the legal distinction between the nuclear family pattern and
others. Indeed, the Supreme Court presented the case as one involving an attempt to supersede a
(single) mother's decision. Nevertheless, during the proceedings, the mother, Tommie Granville,
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D. The Shadow of the Conception of “Children as Property”
Parents are entitled to visitations even without any previous relationship
with the child, as noted, and the parental status-based legal distinction. This
implies that visitation rules do not seek to protect children’s meaningful
126
attachments and that those rules rest instead on other considerations. The
focus of this article has been on social considerations, mainly the preservation of
the traditional model of the nuclear family and the institution of marriage, but
another element also seems to play; a role in constructing visitation laws: the
127
private interests of the parents. Incorporating and protecting adults’ interests in
relation to children generally and parents’ interests specifically is not inherently
objectionable. In the visitation context, however, the recognition and protection
of parents’ private interests embodies the remnants of the notorious conception
married Mr. Kelly Wynn, who legally adopted the two children, Natalie and Isabelle. The girls, then,
had two legally recognized parents raising them in an ostensibly traditional nuclear family. Despite
the Court's attempt to play down the significance of this fact, it cannot be ignored. In fact, Ms.
Granville herself believed that her husband's adoption of the two girls would undermine the
grandparents' claim (though for different reasons). In re Visitation of Troxel, 940 P.2d 698, 701
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
126. The famous case, In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), provides a telling example. In
Baby M., Mary Beth Whitehead entered into a contract with William Stern whereby she agreed to be
artificially inseminated with Stern's sperm, relinquish her parental rights, and deliver the child to
Mr. and Mrs. Stern. After the baby was born, however, Mrs. Whitehead refused to relinquish her
parental rights. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined that Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights
could not be terminated based on the surrogacy contract alone. Thus, her entitlement as a mother to
the companionship of Melissa was taken as evident. Id. at 1236. Though the court awarded custody
to the father, Mr. Stern, Mrs. Whitehead was entitled to visitation because she was the mother of the
child, securing her interest in a continued relationship with Melissa. The New Jersey Supreme Court
remanded the case to the lower court to determine Mrs. Whitehead's rights of visitation. On remand,
the Superior Court determined that Melissa's best interests were served by "unsupervised,
uninterrupted, liberal visitation with her mother." In re Baby M, 542 A.2d 52, 53 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1988). Note that no argument of harm to Melissa from breaking up an existing attachment she
already had could be adduced to justify this award of visitation. Also absent from the court's
decision is a concern of possible harm to the relationship Melissa shared with her custodial father.
The courts' utter disregard for this concern is particularly strange in the circumstances of surrogacy
in general, and in particular those that surrounded the Baby M. case. Unlike the circumstances that
typically surround divorce, Stern and Whitehead had never chosen to have an intimate relationship,
and yet the court imposed a shared (familial) relationship on them. Not surprisingly, this
relationship was characterized by animosity and high conflict. A 1994 story in Redbook, which
featured Baby M. and Mrs. Whithead's family, vividly illustrated some of the complications that
followed from this determination. Janet L. Dolgin, Suffer the Children: Nostalgia, Contradiction and the
New Reproductive Technologies, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473, 526–27 (1996). Mrs. Whitehead emphasized the
contrast between her home and that of the Sterns. She compared her own health with Mrs. Stern's
worsening physical condition as a result of multiple sclerosis. She also found the eating,
conversation, and recreation patterns in the Stern's home seriously wanting in comparison to her
family's. She complained about the child following the "frumpy, old" model set by Mrs. Stern. The
child clearly knew, and apparently frequently heard, that her birth had brought and continues to
bring great sadness to her mother (Note: Legally, there was only one mother, Mrs. Whitehead. Mrs.
Stern was never considered the legal mother.) Id. at 526–27 (1996).
127. Thus, for example, fathers' rights groups highly influence custody and visitation laws. See,
e.g., Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 96, at 462. But parents are not the only adults whose interests
influence family politics and laws. Thus, third party visitation statutes, and particularly statutes
awarding grandparents' visitation, were pushed by powerful grandparents lobbies. See supra note
44.
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of children as their parents’ property, which should be eliminated from current
jurisprudence.
The disturbing history of children construed as chattels and as their
128
parents’ property is well known. This perception has been abandoned at the
declaratory level and all—courts, legislators, and legal scholars—today
129
vehemently reject any such characterization. But although we would like to
think that the conception of children as property belongs only in legal history
130
textbooks, many child advocates have shown that it still casts a shadow.
Barbara Bennet Woodhouse, for example, demonstrated how doctrines of
parental rights, developed at a time when children were still treated as quasi131
property, embody and continue to perpetuate this conception.
When treated as a parental right, visitation laws show traces of this view,
which is manifest, above all, in the language of entitlement. That language
accompanies parental visitation rights, regardless of whether the parents have
132
an established relationship with the child. The proprietary roots of this
parental entitlement are further evident in the quid pro quo approach that
accompanies parents’ rights in general and parental visitation rights in
133
particular. The common reasoning whereby the payment of child support
entitles the father to a certain amount of visitation is an expression of this
134
approach.
The strength of parents’ visitation rights and the reluctance to deny them,
even if the parents are abusive, as well as the traditional exclusivity of parental
rights regarding visitation, further attest to the parents’ proprietary interests in
their children. Exclusive possession and right of use characterize traditional
conceptions of private property. According to this exclusivity rule, then,
children are depicted as property and access to them is a private good to which

128. See, e.g., WALTER O. WEYRAUCH ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW: LEGAL
CONCEPTS AND CHANGING HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS 760 (1994); D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH
APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 951 (2d ed. 2002); MARY ANN MASON,
FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED
STATES 46 (1994); Judith T. Younger, Responsible Parents and Good Children, 14 LAW & INEQ. 489, 497
(1996); Garrison, supra note 28, at 864.
129. See, e.g. Raymond v. Raymond, 345 A.2d 48, 52 (Conn. 1974); In re E.F.V., 461 A.2d 1263,
1268 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid Soc. v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 92–93
(1949); Olinghouse v. Olinghouse, 908 P.2d 280, 286 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995); Commonwealth ex rel.
Robinson v. Ziegler, 35 Pa. D. & C.2d 55, 65 (1964). In fact, the recurring claim in family law
scholarship, family law casebooks, and family law jurisprudence is that children are no longer
perceived as their parents' property but as individuals with their own interests, not only at the
declaratory level but in practice as well. Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV.
825, 848–49 (2004). See also Garrison, supra note 28, at 864, 893–94.
130. See, e.g. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child
as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1042–43 (1992); Dwyer, supra note 4.
131. Woodhouse, supra note 130, at 1042–43.
132. See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 8, at 938–39.
133. About the quid pro quo approach that characterizes parenthood and parental rights, see
Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L. J. 293, 297–98 (1988).
134. Nancy Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and Nurturing Fathers, 54
EMORY L.J. 1271, 1327 (2005).
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only the owner-parents should be entitled. The proprietary roots of visitation
rights as parental rights can also account, at least partly, for the fact that
grandparents have been much more successful than other non-parents in
136
ensuring recognition to their claims for visitation. Special provisions included
in many state statutes ensure the grandparents’ visitation rights upon the death
of their child, their grandchild’s parent. Grandparents thus inherit from their
137
child right of access to their grandchild.
VI. REFORMULATING VISITATION—REFORMULATING PARENTHOOD
A. Choosing Between the Two Faces of Visitation
This survey of visitation jurisprudence reveals two different and conflicting
subtexts on this right. The first emphasizes that underlying this right are
relational values: the continuity of meaningful relationships in children’s lives
and the legal recognition of the nurture and care adults bestow on children. The
second subtext of visitation is less overt and embodies remnants of the
perception of children as their parents’ property, which usually accompanies an
ideology upholding the nuclear family as a legally superior family model and
marriage as a sacred institution. The co-existence of these two subtexts within
visitation thwarts the development of a coherent theory of visitation.
The right to visitation should be detached from the cluster of rights
associated with legal parenthood in order to eliminate the proprietary
connotation of the right to visitation and endorse the relational understanding of
this right. Parents would be entitled to visitation not because of their parental
status but because they care daily for their children. Nor will the distinction
between various non-parents depend on their status as grandparents,
stepparents, and the like, but on whether they had cared for the child. Such a
move would convey that our society values and rewards nurture and care for

135. Woodhouse, supra note 130, at 1113. As noted infra, in Section 6, exclusivity may also serve
worthy goals.
136. One possible explanation for the oftentimes more successful visitation efforts of
grandparents are the comparatively powerful lobbying groups of older Americans, such as the
AARP, in contrast to the less well-organized interest groups such as single fathers or same-sex
partners denied custody.
137. In cases of parental death, some courts have explicitly recognized the visitation rights of
grandparents as "based upon a 'derivative rights' theory which permits the grandparents to stand in
the shoes of a deceased parent so that the child is not completely cut-off from one side of the family."
Preston v. Mercieri, 573 A.2d 128, 132–33 (N.H. 1990). This rationale was more common before the
statutory era of grandparents' visitation. Elaine D. Ingulli, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Social Policies
and Legal Rights, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 295, 311 (1985). Most courts currently reject this line of reasoning.
See, e.g., Sally F. Goldfarb, Visitation for Nonparents After Troxel v. Granville: Where Should States Draw
the Line?, 32 RUTGERS L. J. 783, 817 n.196 (2001). Generally, it is used to support the more limited
extent of visitation rights awarded to grandparents as compared to parents, or to protect the
grandparents' visitation rights following the grandchild's adoption by a stepparent. When courts
adhere to a derivative rights theory of grandparents' visitation rights, an adoption that terminates
the rights of the biological parent is generally also held to end the status of the grandparents upon
which the right to visitation rests, thereby divesting the grandparent of visitation privileges.
Denying this theory enables courts to continue grandparents' visitation despite the adoption. See,
e.g., Preston, 573 A.2d at 133.
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children and would make the interest of children in the continuity of
relationships a central consideration of visitation laws.
B. Parenthood as a Proxy
This critique of the perception of visitation as a parental right in the
previous section focused on the marginalization of relational values that this
construct implies. Because parenthood might ultimately be a proxy for such
relational values as nurture, care, and the preservation of continuous
relationships in children’s lives, this critique might have been misplaced. Thus,
insofar as visitation laws aim to recognize interests immanent in the care of
children and in securing children’s attachments, parenthood could indeed be a
useful and valuable proxy, especially given the justified reluctance to grant
judges discretion to inquire into the quality of child care and the strength of
particular attachments.
Since the use of proxies is based on generalizations, it can be expected to be
both over and under-inclusive. This is an inevitable cost of the reliance on
proxies, which may seem acceptable in light of their benefits. Recognizing nonparents’ visitation rights in statutes and in case law may rectify the underinclusiveness of parenthood as a proxy for nurture and care for children and the
138
meaningful relationships in children’s lives.
Parenthood, however, is an inadequate proxy for the values that should
underlie visitation rights, and extending visitation to non-parents based on a
conception of visitation as a parental right is flawed as a solution. Historically,
parenthood may have been considered a good enough proxy for the nurture and
care of children, as well as for the creation of significant attachments in a child’s
life. This article did not address that question, though there are reasons to doubt
whether this was indeed so, because in today’s reality there are legal parents
who do not care for their children, while an ever-growing number non-parents
do care for children. Moreover, given the current malleability of legal
parenthood, it cannot function as a good enough proxy for strong and
meaningful relationships in children’s lives.
C. Reconceptualizing Parental Rights
Detaching visitation from the cluster of rights associated with parenthood
will transform not only the right to visitation but legal parenthood as such, and
will contribute to the ongoing endeavor of liberating legal parenthood from its
proprietary remnants. Reshaping legal parenthood so as to eliminate the
disgraceful notion of children as property is a long-term project that has been
139
proceeding for over a century. Parenthood is an activity as well as a certain
stance vis-à-vis a child. As an activity, parenthood means caring for a child,

138. Visitation statutes for many non-parents distinguish between various claimants based on
their status. Yet, the post-Troxel understanding of non-parents' visitation rights emphasizes their
entitlement based on the role they assumed in a child's life. See text accompanying supra note 72.
139. See, e.g., MASON, supra note 128. In this respect, this paper joins a series of articles published
over the last two decades, each proposing a specific reform of legal parenthood. See, e.g., Bartlett,
supra note 133; Woodhouse, supra note 24.
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which includes educating, assuming responsibility for, and playing a
supervisory role in a child’s life. As a stance, parenthood emphasizes mainly
biological, genetic, or formal legal ties. The caretaking activity should take
priority in shaping legal doctrines of parental rights, thus contributing to the
140
eradication of parenthood’s proprietary legacy.
An examination of the rights accorded to parents reveals that all the rights
and entitlements that accompany parental status are associated with the raising
of children, except for visitation, which is the only parental right that is not
141
dependent on any prior care for the child. Detaching the right to visitation
from the cluster of rights associated with legal parenthood, therefore,
strengthens the connection between parental rights and parents assuming
142
responsibility for their children. The stronger the connection between parental
rights and child rearing, the greater the justification of these rights and the
143
greater the chances of formulating a better definition of legal parenthood.
The proposition that parental rights are connected to the activity of child
rearing has received some support in Supreme Court cases, most notably the

140. Cf. Woodhouse, supra note 24.
141. Though parents inherit the assets of their offspring who pre-deceased them intestate leaving
no spouse or offspring of their own, inheritance focuses more on the rights of the deceased,
attempting to divide their property based on their assumed wishes.
142. Woodhouse, however, argues that even parental rights associated with child rearing reflect
this notion of children because they were developed at a time when children were still treated as
quasi- property. Woodhouse, supra note 130.
143. Although my argument calls for strengthening the connection between parental rights and
the activity of parenthood, it does not advocate changing the definition of legal parenthood to one
determined on a functional basis. Legal parenthood could indeed be reformed by changing its very
definition rather than merely by detaching visitation rights from the bundle of rights associated with
parental status. Thus, for instance, legal parenthood can be defined functionally, focusing on
parenting activity rather than on biology and genetics, or it can be defined from the children's
perspective. See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 24. In this new definition, detaching visitation from
parental rights would become redundant. With legal parenthood centered around parenthood as the
activity of caring for and assuming responsibility for children, relational values would be injected
into the rights of visitation as a parental right, as they would into all other rights that flow from
parental status. Visitation could thus remain a parental right and still express relational values, since
parenthood itself would embody such values. Despite my recognition that legal parenthood should
undergo extensive changes, mainly to fit the changing reality of American families, I argue that
adopting a purely functional or child-centered approach to define legal parenthood gives judges too
much discretion in allocating parental rights, outweighing the supposed benefit of ensuring better
expression to legal parenthood. Resistance to broad judicial discretion to inquire into the function of
particular relationships and determine whether they establish parenthood and prevail over biology,
genetics, and the like, seems amply justified. In particular, groups suffering from discrimination
have good reasons to distrust the discretion of the judiciary, which is dominated by white, middleupper class men. See Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966) (frequently cited in the context
of parental rights as an instance of these dangers). In Painter, the "bohemian" lifestyle of the
biological father constituted grounds for the court's decision to award permanent custody of a child
to his grandparents, whose lifestyle was "conventional." Id. at 1396, 1400. Painter was a custody case,
rather than a parenthood determination case. The court's disregard of the inherent legal
presumption in the father's favor, however, was based on its view of the grandparents as
psychological parents and of the grandfather as a "father figure," as adduced in a psychological
testimony. Id. at 1399. The decision regarding custody was thus premised on a priori view about the
grandparents' parental status.
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unwed fathers cases noted above, and also in other courts’ case law.
Eliminating the remnants of the “child as property” conception in the definition
of legal parenthood thus requires that, as far as possible, parental legal
entitlements be made dependent on parents assuming daily responsibility for
146
the children’s upbringing.
D. Without Unbundling Parenthood

This proposal, though at first glance it may appear to be doing so, is not a
call for unbundling the cluster of parental rights. Unbundling legal categories
into the respective claim-rights, privileges, powers, and immunities that
comprise them was a project that occupied various legal theorists, particularly
147
following Hohfeld’s work. Private property was probably the central target of
148
such a project. The “unbundling of property” theorists wished to emphasize—
what today seems obvious—that property is a human artifact rather than a
149
natural institution.
As such, property is not an inevitable bundle of
entitlements and, therefore, legal disputes cannot be resolved simply by
reference to the institution of property through application of internal deductive
reasoning. According to this line of reasoning, each element in the bundle of
entitlements called property must be justified separately in the specific context
150
where it arises.
The theory of visitation rights presented in this article has some similarities
with the project of “unbundling property.” It also emphasizes the artificiality of
legal parenthood, which is an artificial rather than a natural (or even a “God
151
given”) status. Hence, this article rejects the idea that legal decisions can be

144. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (U.S. 1983).
145. See, e.g., Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362 (W. Va. 1981).
146. Scholars such as James G. Dwyer would probably argue that parents should have no
Hohfeldian rights whatsoever, whether or not related to their child rearing activity. See, e.g. Dwyer,
supra note 4. Eliminating parental rights and entitlements altogether may appear at first glance as the
best way of eradicating proprietary remnants from legal parenthood. But the practical effect of
parents' rights, and particularly parents' rights to raise their children as they see fit, is to raise the
threshold for state involvement in child rearing decisions and in children's daily lives. Denying these
rights would actually increase state involvement in child rearing, to the children's detriment. See,
e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, Hey, Christians, Leave Your Kids Alone!, 16 CONST COMMENT 149, 154 (1999).
147. WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923).
148. For a description of this analysis of property, see JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE
PROPERTY 27–30 (1988).
149. Locke, for example, attempted to show that property rights could arise in the "state of
nature" apart from government and positive law. For an explication of Locke's theory of property,
see, e.g., Waldron, supra note 148, at 137–251; Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression:
Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540–72 (1993).
150. THEORIES OF RIGHTS 1, 10–11 (Jeremy Waldron, ed. 1984); Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of
Property, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517, 1533 (2003).
151. Whereas property is now obviously regarded as a created institution, the perception of
parenthood and parental rights as a human creation is not as solid. See, e.g. Bartlett, supra note 3, at
887–90; Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835,
845–48 (1985); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845
(1977); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); Behn v. Timmons, 345 So.2d 388, 389
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1373 (Utah 1982).
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made through internal deduction from the concept of parent. It also calls for a
critical examination of the specific claim-rights, immunities, powers, and duties
that comprise parental status, and specifically challenge the right of visitation
that parental status entails. Nonetheless, although the right to visitation should
be detached from the cluster of rights associated with parenthood, this is not a
call for the unbundling of legal parenthood altogether.
Legal institutions, categories, or statuses such as parenthood, however
artificial and fictitious they may be, perform an important role in conveying the
153
notions and ideals intended by the law. They express, support, and enhance
154
social goods and ideals. Whether we think of the expressive role of law in
terms of its concrete social effect or merely in its symbolic meaning, the law
needs to convey its messages and ideals in ways visible to individuals in society.
Since it is unlikely that individuals will know the particular details of specific
legal obligations or entitlements, what is visible to them are fundamental and
155
familiar legal concepts.
Parenthood as a popular symbol, then, may achieve desired social effects
by leading to the internalization of ideals of intimacy, care, and responsibility
toward children in ways impossible to attain through the legal details and
elements that construct this status. Dissolving parenthood, therefore, hinders its
crucial expressive function. When parenthood is perceived as just a bundle of

152. I do not suggest that this approach presents a naturalistic fallacy, moving from "is" (the fact
of being a parent) to "ought" (the judgment that a parent has a special right to visitation). Since
parenthood is a moral term, this "fact" itself is not devoid of moral import, and moving from "is" to
"ought" thus poses no problem. Cf. A. I. MELDEN, RIGHTS AND RIGHT CONDUCT (1959) (discussing the
right of a parent to "special consideration" from his children and suggesting this right is related to
the moral fact of parenthood). But recognizing a moral relation such as parenthood and making a
judgment about what is due to a person by other individuals are two separate issues. Philippa Foot,
Book Review, 70 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 260, 261 (1961) (Reviewing MELDEN, supra note 152).
153. As widely recognized, the law can convey ideas and ideals through its categories, statuses,
and rules. On the expressive role of law, see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996). This view usually encompasses two related accounts. The first
concerns the symbolic aspect of law, and the second concerns the law's ability to direct and affect
human behavior. See, e.g. Lewis A. Kornhauser, No Best Answer?, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1636
(1998); Carl E. Schneider, Marriage, Morals, and the Law: No-Fault Divorce and Moral Discourse, 1994
UTAH L. REV. 503, 567–68. The second and more consequentialist account is debatable, since much
still remains puzzling in the interaction between law and human behavior. See, e.g., Neil
MacCormick, On Legal Decisions and Their Consequences: From Dewey to Dworkin, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.
239, 251–55 (1983); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
144–45 (1991). This is particularly true in the realm of family life and intimate relations, where
ideology, emotions, and other powerful extra-legal forces affect human behavior. See, e.g., Fineman,
supra note 102, at 14–34. Nonetheless, the expressive function of law is not limited to its social effects,
which are somewhat speculative. On the grounds for endorsing the expressive function of law other
than its potential social effects, see Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory
State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 69–70 (1995). For my current purposes, I adopt a modest version whereby,
whatever the admittedly unknown influence of legal rights, they should point in the direction that is
normatively desirable. Dagan, supra note 150, at 1561 n.218.
154. For this argument regarding property, see Dagan, supra note 150. For the specific expressive
role of marital property, see also Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 75, 97–98 (2004).
155. Hanoch Dagan, Correspondence: Just Compensation, Incentives, and Social Meanings, 99
MICH. L. REV. 134, 149–50 (2000).
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duties, obligations, privileges, claim-rights, powers, and immunities, it loses its
powerful connotations. Parenthood has historically implied a dominating and
patriarchal status expressing proprietary interests in children, traces of which
156
are still evident today. And yet, maintaining parental status as a legal category
is still worthwhile because, as a fragmented bundle of obligations and
entitlements, it is unlikely to convey any message at all—neither one of
proprietary interest in children, nor one of commitment, responsibility, and care.
If parenthood is to perform any expressive role, desirable or not, it cannot
become a mere “laundry list” of independent duties, obligations, claim-rights,
immunities, and powers, with an infinite number of potential combinations for
157
bundling them together. A certain measure of stability is also required for the
158
law to have any effective influence, which is unattainable when the status of
parenthood is unbundled and its various constituent elements are capable of
regroupment in countless ways. This article’s argument that the right to
visitation should not be thought of as a parental right, then, is not meant to
unbundle legal parenthood altogether but to claim that the right of visitation is
159
unfit for inclusion in the cluster of elements comprising parental legal status.
E. Maintaining Parental Exclusivity
Recognition of the significant role of parental status is also at the heart of
the argument concerning the significance of this status’ exclusivity. As long as
visitation is understood as a parental right, recognizing non-parents’ visitation
rights challenges the idea of parenthood as an exclusive status, a principle that
should not be easily abandoned. By contrast, if visitation is understood as an
independent relational right detached from parental status, the visitation rights
of non-parents can be recognized while preserving the principle of parental
exclusivity.
The exclusivity of parental status, which states that only a child’s legal
parents have rights and duties considered parental and non-parents cannot
acquire them, has been a well-established principle in American legal
160
tradition. Parental exclusivity is mainly evident in the idea that the child’s
parents rather than the state or other individuals make decisions concerning the
children’s upbringing. Various scholars have criticized the idea of parental

156. Supra note 125 and accompanying text.
157. For the theorists' claim on the "unbundling of property," see Dagan, supra note 150, at 1534.
158. Dagan, supra note 150, at 1562–63. But deconstructing legal concepts and addressing each
element separately also sends a false message concerning the expressive role of law The specific
bundle of obligations and entitlements is not a random event lacking any integrity; rather, a
normative ideal unifies the various obligations and entitlements, and this ideal is what the law
attempts to express. Id. The legal concepts, statuses, and categories, then, represent the ideals that
unify the different obligations and entitlements.
159. Detaching visitation from parental status should not signal the onset of a process of
disintegrating parenthood due to the difference between visitation and other parental rights noted
above. All the rights and entitlements that accompany parental status, except for visitation, are
associated with the activity of raising and taking care of children. Visitation is the only right that
neither accompanies child rearing nor depends upon prior care for the child. See text accompanying
supra note 9.
160. Bartlett, supra note 3, at 883–89.
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exclusivity and the notion that only parents can have rights, duties, and
161
obligations with respect to children. Their critique was largely triggered by the
changes in family structure and the law’s failure to respond to them. Since legal
definitions of parenthood appeared inadequate and unable to reflect the current
reality of parenthood, arguments were raised in support of enabling individuals
who are not legally recognized as parents to acquire parental rights as nonparents. The issue of contact between children and the non-parenting adults
involved in their lives was one of the prime examples highlighting the
162
inadequacy of parenthood as an exclusive status.
Though contact between children and non-parents may at times be
appropriately accorded legal recognition and protection, challenging parental
exclusivity is the wrong course for addressing this issue. Critics of parental
exclusivity fail to recognize the value and the role of this idea. Exclusivity is part
of what defines legal parenthood; parents have a unique relationship with their
children. Undermining parental exclusivity thus erodes the very meaning of
legal parenthood. Diluting the parents’ unique status may lower the threshold
for non-parents to supersede the judgment and decisions of fit parents through
state intervention giving standing and rights to other individuals to make claims
concerning a child. It may even ease the removal of children from their parents
by non-parents, without necessarily meeting a high standard such as parental
unfitness.
It is reasonable to believe that few would support easy removal of children
or the substitution of fit parents’ judgment. On the issue of visitation, the call for
recognizing not only the parents’ rights but also those of others has gained some
support, but an argument that non-parents (be it grandparents, parents’
partners, or other relatives) should have rights to make daily decisions
regarding children’s lives is, barring rare circumstances, much more
objectionable. Most adhere to the parents’ exclusive role as decision-makers and
163
caregivers for their children.
But relinquishing the rule of parental exclusivity to allow for visitations
undermines the very idea of exclusivity, hampering explanations of why
visitation should be recognized as the sole exception to this rule. If non-parents
can gain some rights considered parental, why not allow them all parental
rights? Indeed, Katharine Bartlett, the scholar most closely associated with the
idea that parenthood should not be an exclusive status, applied her argument
not only to visitation rights but to all parental rights, duties, and obligations,
164
including custody. Notions such as de facto parentage blur the line between
parents and non-parents since they are used to confer rights considered parental
upon those who are not legally recognized as parents. But these notions are not

161. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 3, at 883–89; Young, supra note 31; Kavanagh, supra note 31.
162. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 3, at 883–89; Garrison, supra note 85.
163. Young, for example, recognizes the need to preserve core authority, though she does not
recognize it as parental authority. Young, supra note 31.
164. Bartlett, supra note 3.
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limited to conferring rights of visitation and they also enable recognition of non165
parents’ custody rights.
On these grounds, Bartlett and the other scholars who advocate nonexclusive parenthood have been criticized for diluting the legal significance of
parenthood. Parents from marginalized groups such as the poor, or gays and
lesbians, have particular cause for concern from this possible detraction and
166
even severance of their parental status.
This article’s proposal provides a strategy for addressing the problem of
contact between children and non-parental adults who are part of their lives
while also preserving the uniqueness of parental status. Visitation should be an
independent right resting on relational values above all, so that both parents
and non-parents can make a claim for visitation based on an existing meaningful
relationship with a child. In this view, parental rights encompass only those
rights that are an adjunct to the rearing and caring for children. Decision making
and caretaking rights are thus exclusive to parents. This article’s proposal would
enable recognition of non-parents’ visitation rights while maintaining
parenthood as an exclusive status and preserving the parents’ unique
167
authority.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Once visitation is understood as an independent right rather than part of
the parental status cluster, the remaining challenge is to transcend the flow of
rights from relationships and instead translate it into concrete rules. A detailed
proposal for new rules of visitation as they seem to emerge from this analysis of
visitation rights exceeds the scope of the paper. However some broad guidelines
toward such an undertaking will be offered in conclusion.

165. See, e.g., Clark v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d 99, 106 (Ga. 2001); Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152
(Iowa 1966).
166. Painter again serves as a good example. See supra note 143. In the context of gay and lesbian
parents this fear was expressed by Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.
J. 459, 473 (1990); Sears, supra note 62, at 573–74.
167. My proposal is thus also a partial solution to the dilemma faced by lesbian and gay parents,
as it was presented by Nancy Polikoff. On the one hand, lesbian and gay parents seek to strengthen
the uniqueness and exclusivity of parental status to combat threats from homophobic relatives
claiming to raise their children (who should not, according to them, be raised by gay parents), or
otherwise try to interfere in the children's upbringing. Nancy D. Polikoff, The Impact of Troxel v.
Granville on Lesbian and Gay Parents, 32 RUTGERS L. J. 825, 825–27 (2001). On the other hand, in a
growing number of cases involving homosexual couples, a legally recognized mother has used her
exclusive legal status to severe the child's relationship with her ex-partner, who was not legally
recognized as a parent. Parental exclusivity may therefore foreclose the claims of legally
unrecognized lesbian and gay parents. Id. Above all, a solution is obviously called for to enable
recognition of parenthood in same-sex families. This, however, is not the subject of this article. Until
legal definitions of parenthood adapt to parenthood in same-sex families, my understanding of the
right to visitation and of parental right enables advocates of lesbian and gay parents to maintain
parental exclusivity and safeguard their parental status against homophobic relatives. At the same
time, it also enables legally unrecognized parents to claim at least visitation rights with children.
Though this solution is not ideal, it enables the preservation of two ostensibly contradictory claims.
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The first reform concerns the primary question that should be asked in
visitation litigation, namely, whether or not the claimant has an existing
relationship with the child. A distinction should be drawn, then, between claims
to maintain an already existing relationship and claims to create a relationship
that does not yet exist. The longer and more intense the relationship between the
child and the claimant, the stronger the legal presumption should be that
terminating the relationship would be harmful to the child. Indeed, to avoid
subjective judicial assessment of the quality of the relationship between the child
and the claimant (an inquiry potentially suspected as prejudiced and probably
necessitating experts), legal rules should rely on objective criteria such as the
duration and intensity of the relationship as proxy for quality. Biology, genetics,
marital status, or a relationship with the child’s parents should not be utterly
ignored, but they should have only a secondary or supplementary role in legal
rules and decision-making.
This understanding of visitation rights will probably not entail vital
practical changes in the legal outcomes of visitation disputes. Although most
legal parents would still be entitled to visitation rights and many non-parents
would not, this analysis would entail changes in some cases that may be minor,
but are still relevant. The reasons and justifications for awarding or denying
such rights, are the more significant concern. Since these would be crucially
different, they would constitute a change in the results because two radically
168
different frameworks of analysis cannot reach the “same result.” The way of
expressing visitation rights and the reasons adduced for denying them or
recognizing them, therefore, are no less important than the end result.
Understanding the right to visitation as an independent right based on
relational interests of nurture and care does not answer many difficult questions
that occupy both lawmakers and legal scholars. Crucially, since talking about
relational values does not mean that all relationships should be the basis for a
claim of visitation rights, this approach does not explain what relationships
should give rise to such a claim. Furthermore, it does not explain how to
reconcile the authority of the custodial parent making child- rearing decisions
with the recognition of others’ visitation rights, whether parents or non-parents.
These and other issues remain open for future discussion.
This proposal is not intended to foreclose the debate on visitation rights but
to break new ground. The reading of visitation rights outlined here enables to
redirect visitation laws toward a legal model based on the relational interests of
both children and adults, making visitation rules coherent at the level of
principle, and pursuing questions pertaining to adults’ relationship with
children within an adequate conceptual framework. In this respect, approaching
these difficult dilemmas outside the parental status scheme and focusing on
relational values is invariably better than the current status-based rules that
seem to ignore the interests and needs of all the parties involved.

168.
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